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APPLYING THE REVISED ABA MODEL RULES
IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET:
THE PROBLEM OF METADATA
Ronald D. Rotunda*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Symposiums are a tradition that date to the dawn of Western
Civilization. The ancient Greeks often gathered for a convivial meeting
where they leisurely dined and drank while engaged in intellectual
conversation about a particular topic. The word "symposium" derives
from the Greek word meaning to come together and drink.' Plato called
one of his dialogues, the Symposium. 2 The Jewish Seder evolved into a
symposium reflecting on the Exodus from Egypt.3 It is an honor to
participate in this Symposium on Legal Ethics.
The topic of this Symposium focuses on the Ethical Infrastructure
and Culture of Law Firms. The culture of every law firm must
emphasize competence. Indeed, the first rule of legal ethics, the prime
directive, if you will, is competence. To emphasize that point, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules" or "Rules") 4 designates
its first rule, Rule 1.1, "Competence." 5 Competence requires the lawyer
to "keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice," and means that
lawyers must learn about "the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology."'6 That technology increases exponentially the risks of
* Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman
University. I am indebted to Professor Monroe Freedman, Professor Susan Fortney, and Peter R.
Jarvis for their very helpful comments.
1. PETER GARNSEY, FOOD AND SOCIETY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 129 (1999); MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1269 (11 th ed. 2007).
2. PLATO, SYMPOSIUM (Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., Hackett Pub'g Co.
1989). This dialogue discusses the nature of love based on discussions at a dinner or drinking party
that Socrates attended. Id. at xi. The book dates from about 385-380 B.C.E. Id. at xi-xii.
3. STEPHEN M. WYLEN, THE JEWS IN THE TIME OF JESUS: AN INTRODUCTION 101-02 (1996).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013).
5. Id R. 1.1 &cmt. 6.
6. Id.; ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
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inadvertently losing the attorney-client privilege when sending emails,
transferring documents, or responding to discovery.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") may try to lessen the
impact of these mistakes, but its proposed changes in the Model Rules
are ill-considered because they do not take into account that the Rules
cannot prevent lawyers from using evidence that has lost its privilege.
Lawyers in litigation can limit the risks of inadvertent disclosure by
using clawback agreements, but one would be hard-pressed to find such
agreements in the context of negotiation that one does not expect to lead
to litigation. The solution is not to rely on the Model Rules, but to focus
on the prime directive of legal ethics-competence. Lawyers who worry
over what to do about disclosing documents, including the metadata
within documents, should take care not to make the disclosures in the
first place, unless the documents have forensic value so that removing
metadata will unlawfully alter evidence.
Over the last few years, the ABA has been engaged in an extensive
self-evaluation of its Model Rules. One of the primary purposes of the
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 ("Commission 20/20")-the entity
charged with this evaluation-is to bring the Model Rules up to date and
to help law firms keep pace in this age of computers, technology, and the
Internet.7 I will discuss several of these changes and analyze how they
may affect lawyers complying with their ethical obligations.
As every lawyer knows, it is difficult to draft legislation or rules.
Because lawyers are drafting about a topic with which they are
intimately familiar-rules that govern the practice of law-one might
think that they should have an easier time when drafting those rules, as
opposed to drafting rules about safety issues in chicken production or
protocols for animal testing.
That, however, is not the case. Whatever advantage we lawyers
have with intimate knowledge about the subject matter-the practice of
law-we must counterbalance with the self-interest inherent when
lawyers draft rules governing their own behavior. Being too close to an
issue can cloud our vision. 8 Hence, please do not mistake my criticisms
RESOLUTION 105A, at 3 (2012) [hereinafter COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012hod annual-meetin
g_105a.authcheckdam.pdf.
7.

ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW,

at 1 (2012)

[hereinafter
COMMISSION
20/20
INTRODUCTION
AND
OVERVIEW],
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics-2020/20120508-ethics 20 20
final-hod introdution and overview report.authcheckdam.pdf.
8. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALl Members in
Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1998) (pointing out that the views of
lawyers are not always the products of disinterested objectivity).
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of the current product for any criticism of the drafters, who labored
many hours. They labored, burdened by this inherent problem, and
perhaps that explains some of the drafting peculiarities. 9
Commission 20/20's proposals, which the ABA House of Delegates
approved in August of 2012, focus largely on making sure that the
Model Rules take into account the changing world of technology,
computers, electronic discovery, metadata, and the Internet." ° Yet, the
most significant changes, dealing with recurrent issues like metadata
within documents, do not appear to appreciate the significance of the
new technology. 1
To a large extent, the ABA's attitude to modem technology
reminds me of the famous Australian folk song, Waltzing Matilda: the
song is not a waltz, and it is not about a woman named Matilda.12 The
ABA's recent changes to the Model Rules purport to make the Rules upto-date and contemporary in light of high technology, 13 but they do not.
They refer to modem technology, but they are not about it. For that
reason, these revisions may not be very influential.
Prior to Commission 20/20, the most recent effort of the ABA to
come to terms with high technology was its regulation of Internet chat
rooms.' 4 The ABA sought to ban lawyers from chat rooms, but many
9. The ABA House of Delegates, during its August 2012 meeting, also approved of other
revisions that Commission 20/20 advocated. For example, Rule 1.6, Comment 13 states that lawyers
moving from one law firm to another may need to disclose some client information in order to
determine if there are any conflicts of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13
(2013). It includes a strange phrase that appears nowhere else in the Rules: "Any such disclosure
should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved... " Id.
(emphasis added). Normally, we think that the term "person" (unlike "individuals," who are human
beings) includes "entity" or "aggregate." Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute:
Conceptualism and Functionalism in PartnershipLaw, 42 ARK. L. REv. 395, 405, 425 (1989).
Partnerships are aggregates in some states and entities in others. Id. at 402 & n.33, 403. So, is the
point of the language to indicate that the disclosure requirements do not apply to aggregates?
Commission 20/20 does not say that. See generally COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 6
(proposing changes to the Model Rules). Commission 20/20 does not point out that Rule 1.13
covers the "organization" as a client, and "organization" includes both entities and aggregates.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2012); COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra

note 6, at 1-5. One would think that Commission 20/20 means to say something different when it
uses new language. If so, Commission 20/20 should tell us what they are trying to say.
10. COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 1.
11. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
12. DENNIS O'KEEFFE, WALTZING MATILDA: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA'S
FAVOURITE SONG (2012); HARRY HASTINGS PEARCE, ON THE ORIGINS OF WALTZING MATILDA:
EXPRESSION, LYRIC, MELODY 75 (1971).
13. ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT

available at
REPORT],
20/20
COMMISSION
[hereinafter
at
1 (2012)
105A,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012 hod annual-meetin
g_105a.authcheckdam.pdf.
14. See infra Part II.
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states have rejected that ABA Model Rule. 15 Let us briefly look at the
ABA experience with chat rooms, because that incident is a harbinger of
things to come.
II.

INTERNET CHAT ROOMS AND REAL-TIME
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

The ABA's response to Internet chat rooms and the changes it
wrought have not been influential.
A.

The ConstitutionalBackground

First, a little background. We can think of lawyers seeking clients
on a wholesale level-using advertising-or lawyers seeking clients on
a retail level-using solicitation. For many years, the ABA banned
lawyer advertising as well as all lawyer solicitation.' 6 Eventually,
the ABA changed its Rules in belated response to the U.S. Supreme

Court cases that invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, the ban on
lawyer advertising.17

The restrictions on solicitation are more complicated because
lawyers typically approach the prospective client in a face-to-face
encounter. The ABA has expressed concern that the lawyer may
overwhelm the client and that, given the verbal nature of the exchange, it
may be unclear what the lawyer said or what the prospective client
reasonably inferred.18 The Supreme Court has accepted this distinction,

9

even though it later invalidated comparable state rules that banned
solicitation by accountants. 20 The Court accepted the ABA's argument

that lawyers are different because law schools purportedly train them in
the art of persuasion, while accountants do not have that training. 2 1 That
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 355 & n.5, 360 & n.12 (1977).
17. The leading case is Bates, 433 U.S. at 350. For the history leading up to the ABA's
present day Model Rules 7.1 to 7.5, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYER'S ETHICS ch. 11 (4th ed. 2014) (regarding "Solicitation of Clients: The Professional
Responsibility to Chase Ambulances"); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL
ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §§ 7.0-1 to 7.0-4(d) (2012);
5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND

PROCEDURE § 20.31(g) (5th ed. 2013); Ronald D. Rotunda, The CommercialSpeech Doctrinein the
Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1080, 1080-86; Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the
PhilosophicalOrigins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 91, 99-101 (2002).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 1-3 (2012).
19. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
20. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993); see also ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI,
supranote 17, § 7.04(b).
21. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 & n.24 (1978); ROTUNDA &
DZIENKOWSKI, supranote 17, § 7.0-4(b).
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distinction, apparently of constitutional import, justifies some rules that
limit lawyer solicitation.
Yet, the ABA went too far by using its ethics Rules to ban almost
all solicitation, and to apply that ban even when the encounter involved
written communications.2 2 Thus, the Court did not uphold an ABA ban
on all lawyer solicitation.23 In the leading case, the Court allowed the
ban when the factual situation showed that the particular lawyer's
actions were misleading, bullying, and offensive.2 4 Yet, in a companion
case, the Court invalidated the solicitation ban when the

circumstances were more innocent. 25 Between those two extremes, the
law was unclear.26
The first major test arose in connection with the issue of mail
advertising.27 The Supreme Court held that lawyers engage in
"advertising," and not solicitation, when they send mass mailings to
prospective clients. 28 That conclusion makes sense. Unlike a lawyer's
encounter with a prospective client that is face-to-face (what the Model
Rules now call "in-person" contact),29 the lawyer never sees the
prospective client to whom he sends the mailing. 30 All of the
communication is in writing. Because there is a "writing," 31 we
know exactly what the lawyer said, promised, or implied, so it is easy
for the Bar to 32discipline the lawyer if the lawyer's communication
was misleading.
In addition, because the recipient never sees the lawyer, it is easy to
throw away the letter. There is a reason why we call advertising material
"junk mail"-because the decision to deposit it in the circular file (that
22. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,470,472 (1988).
23. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, § 7.0-2.
24. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467-68. In Ohralik, the lawyer "approached two young accident
victims at a time when they were especially incapable of making informed judgments or of
assessing and protecting their own interests." Id.at 467. One prospective client was in a hospital
room in traction, and "[the lawyer] employed a concealed tape recorder, seemingly to insure that he
would have evidence of [the victim's] oral assent to the representation." Id. Later, when one client
tried to fire him, he refused to withdraw. Id.
25. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422, 438-39 (1978). The Court noted in Primus that the
lawyer did not attempt to "pressure" the prospective client into filing the suit. Id.at 417 n.7. In
addition, "[the lawyer's] letter cannot be characterized as a pressure tactic." Id. at 435 n.28. That
suggests that Primus turned on the lack of pressure, as opposed to the nature of the representation
for non-pecuniary gain.
26. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 17, § 12.12.
27. SeelnreR. M.J.,455 U.S. 191,196(1982).
28. See id.
at 206-07.
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
30. Id. (including live telephone and real-time electronic communications but not mailings
when restricting in-person solicitation).
31. Id. R. 1.0(n) (defining the term "writing").
32. See id.
R. 7.1.
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is, wastebasket) is one that people make every day. The recipient does
not have to walk away from the lawyer, who is not physically there. One
is not concerned that she will offend anyone by turning her back,
because there is no back to turn. The recipient does not have to ask
anyone to leave. One might be reluctant to hang up on a telephone
caller, even a rude one. There is, however, no hesitancy in throwing
away a letter.
Moreover, if direct mail by lawyers annoys the recipients, the free
market should provide a self-corrective cure. Prospective clients will not
hire lawyers who have annoyed them with junk mail. If junk mail works,
if it brings in the clients, those clients must not be annoyed.
If mass mailings are "advertising," and not solicitation, then
targeted mailings should be in the same category. It would be hard to
fashion a rationale that says that the First Amendment only protects
lawyers in mailing letters as long as they do so in an economically
inefficient manner.33 Yet, the ABA did not see it that way and its Rules
did not protect targeted mail.34 Some courts agreed, and applied their
version of the ABA Model Rules to restrict such advertising.3 5 Others
allowed targeted direct mail. 6

33. See, e.g., Adams v. Att'y Regis'n & Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of Ill.,
617 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. I1. 1985) (holding, in anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court's review
of the issue, that there is no "principled reason for allowing direct mailing to the public at large, but
not to target audiences"), aff'd, 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986).
34.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (1983) (prohibiting lawyers from using

mailings to solicit clients with whom they have no previous relationship).
35. Judicial antagonism towards lawyers advertising is well illustrated. See, e.g., Allison v.
La. State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978) (holding that lawyers had no free speech right
to send letters to employers soliciting contracts under which employers would collect money from
their employees' wages and give it to lawyers who, in exchange, promised to perform specified
legal services for these employees, as this was an illegal solicitation under the canons of ethics); see
also Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565,
566 (Iowa 1984) (holding that the "rule on lawyer advertising expressly prohibit[ing] television
advertisements which contain background sound, visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic
voice or self-laudatory statements" is constitutional), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985) (relying on
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), in vacating the Iowa Supreme
Court's decision). On remand, and reinstating its previous decision, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
a rule expressly prohibiting the aforementioned lawyer advertising. Comm. on Prof l Ethics &
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 644, 646-47 (Iowa 1985). Iowa
only allowed lawyers to publish advertisements that had all the flair of tombstones.
36. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals held that targeted mailing is advertising, not
solicitation. In re Von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d 838, 841 (N.Y. 1984). In-person solicitation "permits
the exertion of subtle pressure and often demands an immediate response," while targeted direct
mail gives the recipient time to reflect about-or, indeed, ignore-the offer of services, and "the
process of decision-making may actually be aided by information contained in the mailing." Id.
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Finally, there came Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass 'n. 37 In Shapero,
the lawyer applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission
to secure approval of a letter he planned to send to persons whom he
believed were subject to foreclosure suits. 38 Although "[tihe
Commission did not find the letter false or misleading," it cited a
Kentucky Supreme Court Rule that prohibited sending letters
"precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to
the addressee" rather than to the public generally. 39 Kentucky followed
the ABA, but the ABA was behind the curve. 40
Shapero held that this targeted direct mail was advertising and
constitutionally protected. 4' The lawyer clearly could have published his
truthful letter in a newspaper or mailed it in bulk throughout the
community, the Court said.42 Nothing in the First Amendment requires
that lawyers use an inefficient method of distribution.4 3
In addition, there could be no legitimate concern that these letters
would make the targets of the letters feel "overwhelmed." 4 Whether or
not letters are overwhelming has nothing to do with whether lawyers
send them randomly. Written communication also does not present the
same dangers of overreaching. The recipient of this letter, like the
recipient of any printed advertisement (but unlike the recipient of a
lawyer's personal visit), "can readily ... put [the letter] in a drawer to be
considered later, ignored, or discarded., 45 Because some targeted direct
mail may be misleading, that does not authorize the state to ban all
targeted direct mail. The state can simply sanction lawyers who send out
misleading letters, just as it can sanction lawyers who publish
misleading newspaper advertisements.4 6
The following year, in 1989, the ABA reacted to Shapero by
revising Rules 7.2 and 7.3 to codify the constitutional ruling and allow
targeted mailing.4 7
37. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). See Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and
Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 714-29 (1997)
[hereinafter Rotunda, Professionalism].
38. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 469.
39. Id. at 469-70 (quoting Ky. SUP. CT. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1986)).
40. See id. at 470-71.
41. Id. at 472-73.
42. Id. at 473.
43. Id. at 473-74.
44. Id. at 474 (quoting Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 475-76.
46.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2012).

47. ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, §§ 7.0-4(c), 7.0-5. At the time, "the ABA
Model Rules prohibit[ed] mailings to specific individuals as opposed to general mailings." Thomas
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B. Chat Rooms andSolicitationAfter Shapero
This background leads us to the next chapter, "chat rooms." This
term is one that anyone under age thirty will recognize. Are chat rooms
like "face-to-face" encounters or more like junk mail, or targeted mail,
which the recipient can simply ignore?
Chat rooms typically are a form of synchronous conferencing, that
is, "real-time" communication.4 8 The term typically refers to forms of
instant messaging and online forums where participants (typically more
than two) can communicate with the entire group. 49 However, a chat
room can also involve asynchronous conferencing, such as a group of
people corresponding by email.5 0
If I send an email to one or more people, the recipient can answer it
later, or not at all, or immediately, that is, in real-time. I can send an
email to a group of people, and each of them can "reply all" to any
questions or ask questions of their own. Typically, we tend to think of
chat rooms as a real-time online interactive discussion group on a
particular topic. The ABA is much more concerned with "real-time"
communication, 5' which it bans, than with email discussions, which can
take place in real-time if the parties copied on the52 email have good
connections and receive their replies almost instantly.
A chat room is a lot like direct mail advertising. Participants in the
chat room read what the other participants write. Because there is a
"writing," albeit one that is electronic, there is a record of what everyone
says. 3 We know exactly what the lawyer said, promised, or implied, so
it is easy for the Bar to discipline
the lawyer if her communication in the
54
chat room is misleading.
In direct mail advertising or targeted mail, the lawyer will initiate
the communication by sending a letter. In contrast, in a chat room, an
B. Metzloff & Jeffrey M. Smith, The Future of Attorney Advertising and the Interaction Between
Marketing and Liability, 37 MERCER L. REv. 599, 615 (1986) (footnote omitted) (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (1983)). A divided Court upheld a limited restriction on direct
mailing in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995), but that decision did not
persuade the ABA to change its more lenient direct mailing rules. Rotunda, Professionalism,supra
note 37, at 714-29.
48. Martin Whittaker, Ethical ConsiderationsRelated to Blogs, Chat Rooms, and Listservs,
PROF. LAW., June 2012, at 3, 3.
49. Id.
50. Robert E. Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School Revolutionalize
TraditionalLaw School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 852, 856 (2000).

51. Hence, Rule 7.3(a) bans "real-time electronic contact." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
52. See id.R. 7.3 cmt. 3.
53. Id R. 1.0(n).
54. See id.R. 7.1.
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individual interested in the topic of the chat room (pop music, Star Wars,
automobile accident victims looking for lawyers) initiates contact by
joining the chat room. We may also think of a chat room as analogous to
interactive yellow pages. Individuals seek out advertisements when they
turn to the yellow pages. Individuals seek information when they turn to
a chat room. The participants converse with each other by typing at
the keyboard.
Like mail advertisements, there is no face-to-face communication
in a chat room. If we chatted in your living room, the only way I could
avoid the conversation would be to leave the room, and people might
regard that as impolite. If we chatted in my living room, I would have to
ask you to leave, and you might think that is impolite.
Not so in a chat room. Just as Waltzing Matilda is not a waltz and
not about a woman named Matilda, there is no "chatting" in a chat room
and there is no room. It is more like the comment section following a
newspaper article that the newspaper posts online. In the comments
section, people type messages and post their comments.
Whoever does not want to participate in a chat room discussion
does not have to turn his back on the lawyer, who is not physically there.
No one is physically there, because there is no "there." No one offends
anyone by turning his back, because there is no "back" either. The chat
room participant does not have to ask anyone to leave.
One might be reluctant to hang up on a telephone caller, even a
rude one. There is, however, no such hesitancy in not responding in a
chat room. Indeed, some people are "lurkers"-people who read or
observe the chat55 room's ongoing discussion but who seldom, if ever,

participate in it.

Chat rooms are like interactive bulletin boards. The lawyer enters a
chat room, honestly discloses that he is a lawyer, and offers services that
some people in the chat room might find useful. No one has to respond
to the lawyer's comments. If the lawyer asks if anyone is interested, no
one needs to reply. Anyone can leave the chat room without turning
away because there is no room and no human being. This is all occurring
in cyberspace. The lawyer providing truthful information in an electronic
chat room is engaged in "real-time" contact, but no one has to respond.
Leaving a chat room is not abruptly hanging up a phone. If anyone in a
chat room says he does not56want to be solicited, Rule 7.3(b)(1) already
requires the lawyer to stop.

55. Lurker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
visited Nov. 23, 2013).

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lurker

(last

56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)(1) (2012).
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Nonetheless, the ABA did not see it that way. In 2002, the ABA
amended Rule 7.3(a), to ban "real-time electronic" communication.57
That, says the ABA, is a prohibited type of solicitation.5 8 An email is not
necessarily, or always, "real-time," so Rule 7.3(a) does not ban it.59 Yet,
the ABA made clear in Rule 7.3(c) that every "electronic
communication" by a lawyer to a prospective client that solicits
employment must indicate at the beginning and end of the electronic
communication that it is advertising. 60 This requirement certainly warns
the reader that the lawyer is trolling for clients. 61 However, the ABA has
decreed that this requirement, while good enough to protect people who
receive emails, is simply not good enough to protect people who read or
participate in the discussion in a chat room. 62 If the lawyer makes the
disclosure that he or she is a lawyer and has expertise in the area that is
the topic of the chat room, that lawyer will still violate Rule 7.3(a).63 The
question is why: Why does the ABA greet the new64 technology by
banning real-time solicitation but not email solicitation?
Protection of prospective clients in the form of full disclosure that
the lawyer is seeking business applies to all advertising emails, of
course, and similar forms of communication, like a text message.6 5
Similar protection applies to other forms of Internet posting, such as a
blog, when the lawyer is soliciting for clients.66 Nevertheless, chat rooms

57.

ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 17, § 7.3-2(a); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
58. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supranote 17, § 7.3-2(a).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 3 (2012). Rule 7.3(b)(1) requires the
lawyer to stop sending the email if the recipient has so indicated. Id.R. 7.3(b)(1).
60. Id. R. 7.3(c).
61. See id.
62. Id. R. 7.3 cmt. 3.
63. Id. R. 7.3(a).
64. See id. R. 7.3 cmt. 3.
65. See id; Natasha Saggar Sheth, Need a Lawyer? Check Your Text Messages, ABA LITIG.
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top stories/
082213-text-message-attomey-advertising.html.
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmts. 3-4 (2012); see also Hunter v. Va.
State Bar ex rel. Third Dist., 744 S.E.2d 611, 617 (2013). In Hunter, the court held that a lawyer's
blog that primarily discussed cases where he obtained successful outcomes for clients constitutes
commercial speech (not political speech, even though it "contain[s] some political commentary")
that is subject to regulation under Virginia's professional conduct code for lawyers. Hunter, 744
S.E.2d at 617. The court said that the lawyer "admitted that his motivation for the blog is at least in
part economic. The posts are an advertisement in that they predominantly describe cases where he
has received a favorable result for his client." Id. The majority held that the Bar could require the
lawyer to post a disclaimer on all case-related posts. Id. The court remanded so the lower court
could impose a disclaimer that sufficiently warns readers of the blog that case results depend upon a
variety of factors and do not guarantee or predict a similar result in any future case. Id. at 621.
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are different in kind, according to the ABA.67 The ABA bans lawyers
seeking clients in chat rooms no matter how much disclosure the lawyer
gives and no matter how much the lay participants in the chat room
would appreciate the lawyer's presence.6 8
The ABA buries the answer to that question in its official
Comments. 69tot
In response to the changing world of the Internet, the ABA
revised its Comments to assert that "real-time electronic solicitation" of
prospective clients is as abusive as "in-person," that is, face-to-face
encounters. 70 These chat rooms ("real-time electronic solicitation") "may
overwhelm the client's judgment."'" That is why "real-time electronic
solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition.""
The ABA mistakes an assertion for a rationale. The ABA argues
that one is not overwhelmed when reading a posting on a blog or a
webpage, but that same person is overwhelmed, beleaguered, or fraught
when reading the same statement in a chat room. 73 Why is it proper for
the lawyer to send, directly to a prospective client, an email soliciting
legal business (if the lawyer fully discloses at the beginning of his
message that the email is an advertisement), but it is improper for the
lawyer to write the exact same language in a chat room? The email is
proper but the exact same language in the chat room will subject the
lawyer to discipline, including disbarment.74
One would think that it is relevant that there is no "chatting" in a
chat room. There are no people in a chat room, because there is no room.
Instead, everything that anyone "says" is something that someone has
written by using the keyboard. They are typing messages in the exact
same way they would type a letter or type an email. There is no face-toface encounter. There is no "in-person" solicitation.
The ABA discusses none of this. Instead, it simply announces that
there is no writing: the contents of "real-time electronic
conversations.., can be disputed and may not be subject to third-party
scrutiny., 76 That is a strange assertion because there is a digital record of
all the "chatting" in a chat room. Any third party, such as disciplinary
authorities, can scrutinize what the lawyer has said, claimed, or implied.
67. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
68. See id.

69. See id.
R. 7.3 cmts. 2-3.
70. Id. R. 7.3 cmt. 2.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. R. 7.3 cmts. 2-3.

73. See id.
74. See id.
75.
76.

See id. R. 7.3 cmt. 3.
Id.
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Earlier, the Model Rules explicitly defined "writing" to include an
"electronic record of a communication" or an email. 7 That definition in
Rule 1.0 appears to contradict the assertions of Rule 7.3. Model Rule 7.3
takes care of that problem by ignoring it and making no mention of the
Model Rules' definition of "writing., 78 What one writes on the Internet
is written in ink, not erasable pencil. Yet, the ABA asserts there is no
"writing" in a chat room conversation.79
Indeed, a later ABA Formal Ethics Opinion concedes that "[t]here
are obvious differences between in-person and digital social
interactions." 80 Face-to-face conversations are "fluid," while material on
the Internet has "long, perhaps permanent, digital lives," so that these
"statements may be recovered, circulated or printed years after being
sent.', 81 Yet, this Formal Opinion is oblivious that its arguments are
contrary to the ABA Model Rules that it interprets.
C. The Muted Influence of the ABA 's Ban on Chat Rooms
The Supreme Court has not ruled on chat rooms, but there is
substantial evidence that the ABA's antagonism toward chat roomslike its earlier objections to advertising, mass mailings, and targeted
mailings-have not been persuasive with the jurisdictions in charge of
actually enforcing ethics rules. Many jurisdictions have simply refused
to adopt the ABA version
of Rule 7.3(a), with its prohibition of "real83
time electronic contact."
Bar Association ethics opinions that consider the issue often do not
view chat rooms or "real-time" communication the same as a face-to77. Id. R. 1.0(n).
78. See id. R. 7.3.
79. See id. R. 7.3 cmt. 3.
80. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013).
81. Id.
82. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2012).
83. The relevant rule in some jurisdictions uses a different numbering system than the ABA
Model Rules, but the particular rules below correspond to ABA Model Rule 7.3(a). See, e.g., ALA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 & cmt. (2012);
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.11,4-7.18 (2013); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3
(2012); HAw. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2011); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4
(2011); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) & cmt. 3-3A, R. 7.3(c) (2013); MICH. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b) (2013); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2011); NEV.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2011); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2010); P.R.
C6DIGO DE ETICA PROFESIONAL Canon 36 (2010); VT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2012);
VA. STATE BAR PROF'L GUIDELINES R. 7.3 (2013); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3
(2006). Although some jurisdictions have adopted the language of the ABA ban, one cannot find
any cases testing it. See, e.g., N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-703 & cmts. 1-2 (2013); PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013). Washington, D.C. has no version of Rule 7.3. See
generally D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013).
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face encounter. 4 For example, the Philadelphia Bar Association
85
examined lawyer involvement in blogging, email, and chat room posts.
It concluded that each of these forms of communication could occur in
real-time, but the important test was whether the prospective client could
"turn off' the lawyer's communications by not responding or logging
off.8 6 Thus, the Philadelphia Bar Association found that87blogging, email,
and posts in chat rooms are not prohibited solicitations.
The Washington, D.C. Bar has come to similar conclusions. Its
ethics committee discussed a variety of ways that lawyers operate in chat
rooms. 88 In one chat room, inquirers may write questions and lawyers
who visit the site may write answers. 89 At this site, the lawyers often
invite the questioner to call for a brief, initially free, consultation. 90 The
opinion recommends that lawyers give "legal information" on such
websites, but not "legal advice." 91 The former "involves discussion of
legal principles, trends, and considerations-[such as] one might give in
a speech or newspaper article. 92 The opinion treats the lawyers'
information on the Internet the same way it treats the information that
lawyers may offer in a legal advice newspaper column (or the advice of
Ann Landers in a personal advice column). 93
Giving legal advice "involves offering recommendations tailored to
the unique facts of a particular person's circumstances. 9 4 Offering
advice in this chat room, the opinion warns, may embroil the lawyer in
an attorney-client relationship with someone the lawyer does not know
and create obligations greater than the lawyer means to assume.95 Giving
84. A few ethics opinions support the ABA treating chat rooms as prohibited face-to-face
solicitation. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Standing Comm. on Adver., Advisory Op. A-00-1 (rev.) (2010),
available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBETOpin.nsf/ca2dcdaa853ef7b885256728004f87db/

2636a9893f38296385256b2fD06c8a6b?OpenDocument (stating that "[a]n attorney may not solicit
prospective clients through [real time] Internet chat rooms"); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op.
Comm., Op. No. 97-10 (1997), available at http://utahbar.org/rules opspols/ethics opinions/

op_97_10.html (stating that a lawyer may not solicit through real-time chat rooms).
85. Phila. Bar Ass'n Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 2010-6 (2010), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/C
MSResources/Opinion%/202010-6.pdf.

86. Id.
87. Id. The opinion warned lawyers not to participate in real-time voice conversations in chat
rooms, and, of course, not to engage in false and misleading statements. See id.
88.

See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002), available at http://www.dcbar.org/

for-lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion316.cfm.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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legal information is different from giving legal advice. For example,
a law professor not admitted to the Bar in the relevant jurisdiction can
still teach about torts (legal information), but cannot offer particularized
legal advice and 96apply the law to the facts faced by a client or
prospective client.
California is yet another jurisdiction (and a rather large one) that
has rejected the ABA ban. 97 California opined that chat room contact
with prospective fee-paying clients does not necessarily constitute
improper solicitation under California Rule 1-400.98 This ethics opinion
considered the situation of a personal injury lawyer who entered a chat
room created for the specific purpose of providing emotional support for
the victims and families of a recent disaster.99 The lawyer who offered
advice conceded that she had hoped to enlist clients. 100 The opinion
agreed that the lawyer's conduct was a "communication," because she
entered the chat room and identified herself as a lawyer to show her
"availability for professional employment."' 1 In addition, the
lawyer's pecuniary gain was a "significant motive."' 2 However, the
opinion found that the conduct was not a "solicitation" for purposes of
Rule 1-400(B) because chat room communication occurs via a computer,
and, thus, is not "in person.' 1 3 There is no California rule that

96.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmts. 1, 3 (2012).

97. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2004166 (2008), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-flbdTW9KlfO =
&tabid=838.
98. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2008); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on
Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2004-166 (2008),
99. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2004166 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
102. Id.(quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). ABA Rule 7.3(a) defines solicitation, in part, as relying on the case where "a significant
motive for the lawyer's [direct contact with the prospective client] is the lawyer's pecuniary gain."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012).
103. Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2004166 (2008) (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, this opinion added that the communication in this particular case was
presumptively impermissible under Rule 1-400(D)(5). Id. The Rule prohibits communications
transmitted in a manner involving "intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, or
vexatious or harassing conduct." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (2008). The very
purpose of this particular chat room was to support disaster victims, and a lawyer should know that
disaster victims are likely to be relatively less able to make careful judgments about hiring a lawyer.
See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2004-166
(2008).
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189

prohibits "realcorresponds to the ABA's Model Rule 7.3(a), which
14
time" electronic contact for purposes of solicitation.'
III.

THE MISDIRECTED FAx OR EMAIL

The ABA's ban on chat rooms has not persuaded many Bar
Associations. Let us turn to the problem of the misdirected fax and the
search for metadata to see if the ABA's most recent viewpoint will have
greater influence with state Bars.
A.

The 2012 ABA Revisions to Rule 4.4(b)

In 2012, the ABA House of Delegates made two minor changes to
Rule 4.4(b), approving what Commission 20/20 proposed.'0 5 This Rule,
with the changes in italics, now reads as follows: "A lawyer who
receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should
information was
know that the document or electronically stored
' 10 6
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender."
Before this revision, no one seriously thought that electronic
documents were not "documents." It appears that this change to the
black letter rule merely states that, if the lawyer inadvertently sends a
hardcopy document or an electronic document-for example, the lawyer
intends to send an email to his client, but inadvertently sends that
particular email to the opposing lawyer-then the lawyer must advise
the sender of his mistake. 10 7 If that is what the change in the black letter
rule means, it means little because lawyers already know that
"document" includes "electronic document." Yet, Commission 20/20
makes a rather odd assertion in its Report to the ABA House of
Delegates. That Report claims that the term "documents" is "a word that
has left lawyers with limited1 8guidance when they receive inadvertently
sent electronic information.' 0
104.

See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.

2004-166 (2008).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012); COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supranote 6, at 5.
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2013) (emphasis added); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012); see COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 5.
107. COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.4(b) (2013).
108. COMMISSION 20/20 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 9. ABA Commission

20/20 announced: "Model Rule 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons) and its Comments
currently describes a lawyer's obligations when in receipt of inadvertently disclosed 'documents,' a
word that has left lawyers with limited guidance when they receive inadvertently sent electronic
information." Id. at 9. However, the factual assertion that lawyers had "limited guidance" is like

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 18

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:175

The ABA's own Model Rules belie the strange claim that lawyers
had "limited guidance" in trying to determine what the term
"documents" meant. 10 9 Long before Commission 20/20 came into
existence, the Terminology section of the Model Rules defined "writing"
110
to include "tangible or electronic" records of any communication.
Moreover, Rule 4.4, before the revisions of Commission 20/20, already
said quite explicitly in Comment 2 that "'document' includes e-mail or
other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into
readable form."'11 Rule 3.4 prohibits lawyers from concealing evidence,
and neither that Rule nor its associated Comment saw the need to
explain that "documents" includes electronically stored information.112
Commission 20/20 also did not see the need to change Rule 3.4 to
conform to Rule 4.4(b). 113 And, modem dictionaries routinely define
' 114
"document" to include "electronic document" or "computer data file."
Nonetheless, Commission 20/20 represented to the ABA House of
Delegates that the term "documents" "has left lawyers with limited
' 15
guidance" as to whether it includes "electronic information."'
seeing a fly in my soup: it is hard to swallow. Lawyers knew that writings include electronic
writings, as Rule 1.0(n) already provided. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(n) (2012).
Moreover, the ABA has long applied Rule 4.4 to faxes (in particular, the problem of the misdirected
fax). See id R. 4.4 cmt. 2. A "fax" is an electronic document, with the fax machine sending data
through cyberspace, and the receiving fax machine interpreting those symbols and then translating
them into language we can read. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 179 (2005); see also Fax
Machine, THEFREEDICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/fax+machine (last visited Nov.
23, 2013).
109. COMMISSION 20/20 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 9; see COMMISSION
20/20 REPORT, supranote 13, at 2 ("[T]he Commission is proposing to amend Rule 4.4(b) to make
clear that the Rule governs both paper documents as well as electronically stored information.").
110. Model Rule 1.0(n) provides that:
'Writing' or 'written' denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or
representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography,
audio or videorecording and email. A 'signed' writing includes an electronic sound,
symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(n) (2003).

111. Id. R. 4.4 & cmt. 2.
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) & cmt. 2 (2012).
113. See COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 5; compare MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2013).
114. Several dictionaries define "document" as a "computer file." See, e.g., MERRIAMWEBSTER
DICTIONARY
145
(2005);
Document,
AM.
HERITAGE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=document&submit.x=33&submit.y=25
(last
visited Nov. 23, 2013); Document, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
document
(last
visited
Nov.
23,
2013);
Document,
THEFREEDICTIONARY,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/document (last visited Nov. 23, 2013); Document Legal
Definition, YOURDICTIONARY.COM http://law.yourdictionary.com/document (last visited Nov. 23,
2013) (defining a "document" as "information captured on paper or in electronic format").
115. COMMISSION 20/20 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, supra note 7, at 9.
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Commission 20/20 does not indicate why it never told the House of
Delegates that both the Model Rules Terminology section and Rule 4.4,
prior to the revision, ' had
already defined "documents" to include
"electronic documents." " 16
One possible reason for this omission is that the members of
Commission 20/20 never read the existing Rules carefully, particularly
Rule 4.4, Comment 2. That hardly seems likely. However, if that
explanation does not fly, then the alternative explanation-that
Commission 20/20 was not candid in its Report to the House of
Delegates-is not a pretty conclusion either. It suggests that
Commission 20/20 wanted to make a change but would not, or could
not, articulate its real reason.
The additional language to the black letter Rule that the ABA
adopted after Commission 20/20's recommendation makes this Rule
verbose, but the Report to the ABA suggests that there is no intent to
change the meaning of this Rule.' 1 7 Commission 20/20's Report to the
ABA House of Delegates indicates that the purpose of this change is
merely to recognize the world of cyberspace. 118 In addition, it helps
lawyers who read Rule 4.2 but do not bother to read its Comments or
Terminology-although lawyers who do not read the Comments or
Terminology already have substantial competence problems.
However, the changes to the Comments of Rule 4.4 discussed
below are more significant: they indicate that the drafters of the
revisions to Rule 4.4 explicitly intend to prevent mining of metadata
even when the lawyer intentionally turns over the electronic
document.' 19 If so, that would mean that a lawyer could examine
fingerprints on a physical document, but could not look at the metadata
contained in an electronic document unless the lawyer jumps over the
hoops that Rule 4.4(b) creates: the lawyer must "promptly notify" the
sender. 20 Moreover, the Comments proclaim that the lawyer receiving
the document that the other lawyer intentionally sent him has a right
(without client consent) to delete it unread, even if the information is
very relevant and useful to the case. 21 Let us turn to that issue.

116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(n), 3.4 & cmt. 2 (2003); see COMMISSION
20/20 RESOLUTION, supranote 6, at 5-6 (proposing changes to Model Rule 4.4).
117. COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-7.

118. See id.
119. Seeid.at6.
120.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2013).

121. Id. R. 4.4(b) & cmts. 2-3; COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 18

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 42:175

The ABA Revisions to the Comments of Rule 4.4

The changes in the Comments to Rule 4.4 are substantially more
significant than the addition to Rule 4.4(b). These revisions deal with,
and relate to, what the literature often calls the problem of22the
misdirected email, the misdirected fax, and the mining of metadata. 1
The ABA made significant changes to Rule 4.4, Comments 2 and 3
(discussed below) that deal with metadata1 23 Metadata is information
about a document found in the computer code, often revealed with little
effort, such as by clicking "show markup" (or "file properties") in a
Microsoft Word document. 2 4 We shall turn to these two changes
shortly, but first we have to discuss the ABA's resolution of a related
125
problem-inadvertently disclosed documents, emails, and faxes.
Then, we shall analyze the difficulties that the ABA's revisions to Rule
4.4's Comments have created due
to the ABA's attempt to treat metadata
126
fax.
misdirected
a
as
the same
C. Inadvertently DisclosedDocuments, Emails, or Faxes
Once again, we first must consider the historical background. What
are the ethics responsibilities, if any, when a lawyer receives from her
opposing lawyer a document, or an email, or a fax that the opposing
lawyer sent inadvertently, by accident? Does that question involve the
law of ethics, or does it really involve the law of evidence?
Is there anything improper if a lawyer takes advantage of the
opponent's mistake, such as an opponent who mistakenly files a day
after the statute of limitations? When legal ethics was in its infancy, it
was easy to find unenforced homilies of a bygone era that considered
that question as serious. David Hoffman, whose work led to the first
ethics rules for lawyers, advised over 150 years ago: "I will never plead
the Statute of Limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time; for if
my client is conscious he owes the debt; and has no other defence
than
127
the legal bar,he shall never make me a partner in his knavery."'
That sentiment sounds archaic in the modem era. Nowadays,
lawyers routinely take advantage of the mistakes of their opposing
122.
REPORT,
123.
124.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmts. 2-3 (2013); COMMISSION 20/20

supra note 13, at 5-6.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmts. 2-3 (2013).
See NAT'L INFO. STANDARDS ORG., UNDERSTANDING METADATA 1 (2004), available at

http://www.niso.org/publications/pressfUnderstandingMetadata.pdf.
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2013); discussion infra Part HI.C.
126. See discussion infra Part [V.A.
127.

DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 754 (William S. Hein & Co. 1968)

(1846).
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counsel.1 28 Sometimes they do so with unmasked glee. If the lawyer fails
to raise a statute of limitations defense, to file a compulsory
counterclaim, or to file a document on time, then the client pays for his
lawyer's mistake. 29 The client, in turn, may often sue the lawyer for
malpractice. If lawyers could not take advantage of their adversary's
mistakes, the law of malpractice would often be unnecessary.
If a lawyer asks a question in a trial and the other lawyer (through
incompetence or otherwise) fails to object on the grounds of hearsay, the
judge and jury will hear the evidence. 30 The lawyer asking the question
feels no ethical qualms about taking advantage of such an error.
Similarly, if the plaintiffs lawyer asks a question that calls for

128. See Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous Disclosure of DamagingInformation: A Response
to ProfessorAndrew Perlman, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 179, 180-83 (2006) (arguing that a lawyer
should use information that is inadvertently disclosed to benefit her client). Professor Freedman
analyzes and disagrees with Professor Andrew Perlman's position that an attorney should ignore
and delete any document gained through an inadvertent disclosure. Id; see generally Andrew M.
Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent
Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 767 (2005) (stating that, even where an inadvertent disclosure
results in an automatic waiver of the attorney-client privilege, ethics rules should not necessarily
allow the lawyer to take advantage of the legal right to use the document for reasons such as
professionalism or morality).
129. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991) (holding that the
ineffectiveness of post-conviction appellate counsel could not qualify as a cause that excused the
defendant from complying with the procedural rules). In Coleman, the jury convicted the petitioner
of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Id. at 726-27. The Court did not excuse the petitioner
simply because his lawyer's error led to the late filing of his state habeas appeal. Id.at 752-53.
There are exceptions to this rule, as discussed in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 920-26 (2012).
Two associates at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, working pro bono, sought state habeas corpus relief
for a defendant sentenced to death. Id.at 916. A local Alabama lawyer moved their admission pro
hac vice. Id. at 919. However, the Alabama lawyer asserted that he "could not 'deal with substantive
issues in the case."' Id.Later, the two associates left Sullivan & Cromwell, accepting new posts of
employment which rendered them unable to represent the defendant. Id.Neither associate sought
the trial court's leave to withdraw (which Alabama law required), nor found anyone to assume the
representation. Id.at 924-25. Moreover, no other Sullivan & Cromwell lawyer entered an
appearance, moved to substitute counsel, or otherwise notified the court of a change in defendant's
representation. Id.at 925-26. The Court reaffirmed the basic principle that the negligence of a
lawyer representing a client seeking post-conviction relief does not qualify as "cause," which would
excuse the prisoner from following a state procedural rule. Id.at 922 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at
753). The lawyer is the prisoner's agent. Id. Under "well-settled" agency law, the principal bears the
risk of his agent's negligent conduct. Id.(quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54). Thus, a lawyer's
failure to meet a filing deadline binds his client, who cannot rely on that failure to establish cause
for failure to comply with the state procedural rule. Id.(citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54).
However, the Court said that, as in Maples, "[a] markedly different situation is presented... when
an attorney abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the default. Having severed
the principal-agent relationship, an attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client's
representative." Id. at 922-23 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 31 cmt. f (2000)). Nor can the court blame the client for failing to act on his own behalf because
he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing him. See id.
130. ROTUNDA & DzIENKoWsKI, supranote 17, § 3.4-6.
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information from the defendant that the marital privilege or the attorneyclient privilege may protect, 13 1 it is the responsibility of the defendant's
lawyer to raise the objection. 132 The same result applies to a lawyer who
mistakenly turns over a damaging document that the other side did not
subpoena. 33 If lawyers were not liable for their mistakes, malpractice
insurance would be less expensive.
D. Mistakenly DisclosingPrivilegedInformation:
The Problem of Waiver in the Law of Evidence
Should the same result apply to a lawyer who mistakenly turns over
a damaging document that the other side did not subpoena, when a
privilege (for example, the attomey-client privilege or the spousal
privilege) protects that document? Alternatively, let us assume that the
lawyer turns over a document subject to subpoena but for the fact that
the attorney-client privilege would excuse its discovery. Can the
opposing party take advantage of the other lawyer's mistake? Assume,
for example, the lawyer (or her secretary) accidentally staples a copy of
a privileged letter from the client to the lawyer discussing the stance
regarding settlement negotiations. Or, the lawyer turns over a series of
documents and mistakenly fails to assert the privilege to one document.
Many of the relevant cases concern the attorney-client privilege, so we
will focus on them, but the principle applies to any evidentiary privilege.
How we deal with material that an evidentiary privilege protects (or
may protect) is hardly a new issue. Lawyers and their secretaries and
paralegals have made such mistakes long before we had fax machines
and email. However, the existence of these technological advances,
coupled with other technology-such as the possibility of sending a
blast email or a blast fax to a host of lawyers all at once-magnifies the
problem. The lawyer or secretary could press one button and the fax
would go to (1) all lawyers instead of (2) all lawyers on the plaintiffs'
coordinating committee. The advent of this new technology means that
large, very competent law firms can make the same mistakes that
incompetent solo lawyers made in days of old.
One way to think of the problem is to ask whether, under the law of
evidence, a privileged document loses its privileged status when the
131. It is not unethical for a lawyer to ask a question that may call for evidence that the
opposing lawyer claims is hearsay. See id. (noting that hearsay does not fall into the category of
information which a lawyer cannot ethically allude to if it is not reasonably believed to be relevant
or admissible).
132. The lawyer objecting to the evidence has the obligation to invoke available protection on
behalf of her client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63 cmt. b (2000).

133. See id.
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client, the lawyer, or the assistant mistakenly turns it over. This is a
complicated area and the cases do not agree. 134 Some courts have been
derogate
very antagonistic to the attorney-client privilege because it1can
36
135
the search for truth. These cases are quick to find waiver.
Consider the situation where an eavesdropper overhears a
privileged conversation between the lawyer and client. There are two
maj or fact patterns. First, the holder of the privilege (or his agent) acted
reasonably, but someone overheard the privileged conversation or
received the privileged document anyway. The second situation is where
the holder of the privilege (or his agent) did not act reasonably in
protecting its confidentiality.
For the first variation of the eavesdropper rule, let us further assume
the two parties to the conversation did not know that an eavesdropper
was overhearing them. No less an authority than John Henry Wigmore
believed that the privilege should not apply in that situation.' 37 The
Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute ("ALI") also
adopted that position, 38 and many common law jurisdictions outside the
United States have adopted it. 139 These authorities allow the
134. Timothy P. Glynn, FederalizingPrivilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 72 n.52 (2002) (stating
that the number of federal cases on the attorney-client privilege doctrine exceeds 5000, and there is
"a similar body of state case law"); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 71 reporter's n. to cmt. b (2000) ("The approach of modem evidence codes varies. Some are
consistent with a subjective (intent) concept; others seem to refer to circumstances reasonably
apparent.").
135. E.g., Doe v. Poe, 664 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 700 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y.
1998) ("The attorney-client privilege must be narrowly construed, and generally does not extend to
communications between a client and his or her counsel which are made in the known presence of a
third party." (citations omitted)). In this case, the court did not apply the privilege to
communications by the former law partner of the bank's chief executive officer ("CEO") to the
bank's lawyers. Id.This former law partner was not acting as the bank's lawyer in making
communications at a meeting between the CEO and the bank's lawyers because he was not present
to provide legal advice or services to the bank or its lawyers. Id.
136. See, e.g., id.
137. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2339 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore believed that the risk of eavesdropping is so far from the
minds of the communicating parties that allowing eavesdroppers to testify has little effect on their
willingness to communicate with each other. EDWARD J. IMWNKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A

TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 6.6.3 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002); 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5489 (1986) ("Wigmore
defended the common law limitation on the instrumental ground that it reduced the evidentiary loss
caused by the privilege... "(citing WIGMORE, supra, § 2326)).
138. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 210 & cmt. b (1942). The ALI later rejected this
eavesdropper rule, asserting that the new lawyer-client privilege "goes further than the Model Code
by preventing disclosure of communications overheard by eavesdroppers." UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE R. 26 cmt. (1953).
139.

SUZANNE. B. MCNICOL, LAW OF PRIVILEGE 26 (1992) (noting that loss of privilege

because of eavesdroppers overhearing is still the "general rule"). As the Supreme Court
acknowledged, in a different context, "[t]he risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper.., is
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eavesdropper to testify to what he had overheard in a conversation even
though the participants did not 1know,
and reasonably could not have
40
known, about the eavesdropping.
In re GrandJury Proceedings141 is an instructive case. While under
investigation, Berkley and Co., Inc. ("Berkley") complained that the
grand jury should not be able to consider certain documents because the
attorney-client privilege protected them. 142 The court conceded that the
documents were within the attomey-client privilege. 143 Nonetheless, the
court then held that Berkley lost the privilege because an employee had
stolen the documents: "The protection afforded by the privilege,
however, does not apply to the documents obtained from Berkley's
former employee, for the privilege does not apply to stolen or lost
documents."' 44 The court relied on Wigmore's Evidence in Trials at
Common Law:
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of
documents from the attorney's possession, are not protected by the
privilege, on the principle that, since the law has granted secrecy so far
as its own process goes, it leaves to the client and attorney to take the
measures of caution sufficient to prevent being overheard by third
parties. The risk of insufficient precautions
is upon the client. This
145
principle applies equally to documents.

probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume
whenever we speak." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. The early position in the case law was that the surreptitious eavesdropper (but not the
lawyer) could testify to what he had overheard even though the conversation was otherwise within
the attorney-client privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 137, § 6.6.3; see, e.g., Clark v. State, 261
S.W.2d 339, 340-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953). In Clark, the court allowed a telephone operator to
testify to the contents of a telephone conversation between the defendant charged with murder and
his lawyer. Id. The telephone operator's eavesdropping was admittedly in violation of company
rule, but that did not preclude the testimony. Id. at 341. The court relied on Wigmore in admitting
the evidence. Id. at 342; see also United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F.
Supp. 1243, 1252 (D. Md. 1995). In Mayman, the defendant government contractor disclosed to the
government (during settlement negotiations over a billing dispute) that it had relied on
contemporaneous memoranda from in-house counsel in its belief that its billing practices were legal.
Id. at 1247-48. The contractor thereby waived the attorney-client privilege as to the entire subject
matter dealing with that controversial billing practice, including internal memorandum from inhouse counsel that a former employee had stolen. Id. at 1246, 1252-53.
141. 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979), affdas modified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 868.
143. Id. ("The company appears to be correct in its assertion.").
144. Id. at 868.
145. Id. (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 137, § 2325 (citation omitted)). Cases have applied
this rule in criminal settings to remove the privilege from an incriminatory letter that the accused
wrote to his wife, but which accidentally fell into the hands of another. See, e.g., Hammons v. State,
84 S.W. 718, 719 (Ark. 1905). In Hammons, the court held that the letter was admissible against the
defendant. Id. at 719. In that case, the defendant was sentenced to death. Id.
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Note that the holder of the privilege acted reasonably. The third
party stole the documents. 46 Still, the court held, initially, that
147
the privilege was lost.
Modem American cases tend to reject
48
1
position.
Wigmore's
Nonetheless, some cases hold that, if a litigant inadvertently or even
involuntarily turns over a document to the opposing party, the privilege
is lost forever. 149 In such cases, a plaintiffs claim that production "was
inadvertent and involuntary or if it is deemed voluntary that the privilege
is waived only as to the piece of paper but nothing else," is "an
untenable position."' 150 Under these cases, if the opposing side
inadvertently turned over a privileged document, the lawyer who
received that document may use it, under the law of evidence, because
the document has lost its privilege.' Keep that in mind. If the document
has lost its privilege under the law of evidence, why would it be
unethical, under the Model Rules, for the receiving lawyer to use that
document? If the other side inadvertently files a compulsory
counterclaim two days after the statute of limitations has passed, we
know that it would be ethical for the receiving lawyer to plead the statute
of limitations. Indeed, it would be incompetent for the lawyer not to
146. In re GrandJuryProceedingsInvolving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. at 868.
147. Id.at 869. The court, in response to a motion forconsideration, allowed Berkeley to show
that it took reasonable precautions to protect the confidentiality of the documents. Id. at 870.
148. Id. at 869. In response to Berkley's motion for consideration, the court ruled:
While the cases concerning stolen privileged documents are rare, eavesdropper cases are
somewhat more common, and the modem trend appears to be away from Wigmore and
toward a principle that the privileged status is not lost when the attorney and client take
reasonable precautions to ensure confidentiality but nonetheless are overheard by a
surreptitious eavesdropper. The same principle presumably would apply to stolen
documents.
...Thus, modem precedent would seem to suggest that the documents disclosed by [the
third party] should not lose their privileged status simply because of the manner in which
they were disclosed.
Id. (citation omitted); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, MARGARET A. BERGER & JOSEPH M MCLAUGHLtN,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, I 503(b)[02] (1997). The court then allowed Berkley to show that it
engaged in reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of the documents. In re GrandJury
Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. at 870; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 reporter's n. to cmt. c (2000) ("Older authority held that an
eavesdropper could testify to privileged conversations even if client and lawyer took reasonable
precautions to achieve privacy. That is the traditional English view." (citation omitted)).
149. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (D.D.C. 1970).
150. Id.at 549; see also Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 6667 (D.D.C. 1984) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that intent is necessary to waive the attorney-client
privilege in holding that "waiver can occur through inadvertence"); United States v. Willis, 565 F.
Supp. 1186, 1204-05 (S.D. Iowa 1983); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 486 F. Supp, 1328,
1332 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C.
1974). These cases all follow Wigmore's unforgiving rule. See WIGMORE, supra note 137, § 2327.
151. See, e.g., In re GrandJury ProceedingsInvolving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. at 870.
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plead the statute of limitations, unless his client knowingly decides to
waive the limitations defense.' 5 2
The second type of eavesdropper involves the situation where the
parties communicating in confidence did not act reasonably. For
example, they knew or reasonably should have known that an
eavesdropper or snooper could overhear their conversation. This line of
cases, typically reflecting the more recent case law, holds that the court
will not uphold the privilege if the client and lawyer did not take
reasonable precautions to treat the information as privileged and
confidential.' 53 For example, the Restatement
(Third) of the Law
54
approach.
this
adopts
Lawyers
Governing
Courts following the Restatement will apply the privilege to a
document that a former employee stole from the employer, if the
55
employer took reasonable precautions to keep the material privileged.
In contrast, if the parties
did not act reasonably, these courts will treat
56
the privilege as waived.
For example, if the client talks "with a lawyer in a loud voice in a
public place where non-privileged persons could readily overhear," the
152.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).

153.

See, e.g., Bowles v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Home Builders, 224 F.R.D. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 2004).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71. Section 71 provides:
A communication is in confidence within the meaning of § 68 if, at the time and in the
circumstances of the communication, the communicating person reasonablybelieves that
no one will learn the contents of the communication except a privileged person as
defined in § 70 or another person with whom communications are protected under a
similar privilege.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254,
258 (N.D. I11.1981) ("[E]ven inadvertent communication to third parties, such as bystanders or
eavesdroppers, destroys the privilege, at least where the eavesdropping is not surreptitious and the
attorney and client have made little effort to insure that they are not overheard."); People v. Castiel,
315 P.2d 79, 83 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (noting that a third person openly present who overhears
a conversation may testify); State v. Vennard, 270 A.2d 837, 849 (Conn. 1970) (confirming that
police officer who overheard conversation in police station may testify where no evidence indicated
that defendant sought to insure confidentiality of the communication); Schwartz v. Wenger, 124
N.W.2d 489, 491-92 (Minn. 1963) (noting that a third person who overheard a conversation in a
public corridor, without resort to surreptitious methods, may testify); Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d
339, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953) (holding that a telephone operator may testify to the contents of an
otherwise privileged conversation).
155. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1246
(D. Md. 1995). This court stated that:
[T]he Court finds that the Defendant did not fail to take reasonable precautions to
preserve the confidentially of a privileged document. The document in issue was
maintained in a secure building and all who had authorized access to it were under a
legal obligation to maintain it as confidential. The only way that confidentiality was
breached was due to the unauthorized action of a trusted employee.., in obtaining a
copy of part of a document and the outright theft of a copy ....
Id.
156. See Bowles, 224 F.R.D. at 253.
154.
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client will lose the privilege because the circumstances indicate that the
client does not "reasonably" expect secrecy. 57 The circumstances
reasonably evident to the person communicating, not to the
eavesdropper, are relevant. 58 "Thus, the presence of a surreptitious
eavesdropper does not destroy confidentiality."' 59 The parties
speaking in confidence could not reasonably know of a surreptitious,
hidden eavesdropper.
Negligent handling of privileged documents and conversations will
destroy the privilege. 60 This loss can be particularly significant because,
under the law of evidence, the loss of the privilege of one document also
as "to all other communications
extends to related documents, as well
16
relating to the same subject matter." 1
The Restatement provides two helpful Illustrations that exemplify
what constitutes reasonable efforts to keep a conversation
confidential. 6 2 The same principle would apply to keeping a document
confidential. 163 These Illustrations provide:
1. Client and Lawyer confer in Client's office about a legal matter.
Client realizes that occupants of nearby offices can normally hear the
sound of voices coming from Client's office but reasonably supposes
they cannot intelligibly detect individual words. An occupant of an
adjoining office secretly records the conference between Client and
Lawyer and is able to make out the contents of their communications.
Even if it violates no law in the jurisdiction, the secret recording
ordinarily would not be anticipated by persons wishing to confer
in confidence. Accordingly, the fact that the eavesdropper
overheard the Client-Lawyer communications does not impair their
confidential status.
2. During a recess in a trial, Client and Lawyer walk into a
courthouse corridor crowded with other persons attending the trial and
discuss Client's intended testimony in tones loud enough to be readily
overheard by bystanders. As Lawyer knows, the courthouse premises
include several areas more appropriate for a confidential conversation
than the corridor. The corridor conversation is not in confidence for the
purposes of the privilege, and the privilege does not bar examining
either Client or Lawyer concerning it. 164

157.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. c (2000).

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
See Bowles, 224 F.R.D. at 253.
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

162.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. c, illus. 1-2 (2000).

163. See id.
164. Id.; see Schwartz v. Wenger, 124 N.W.2d 489, 491-92 (Minn. 1963) (holding that the
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Under this line of cases, if the opposing party inadvertently
disclosed the privileged document, that inadvertent turnover would not
waive the privilege if the opposing party acted reasonably. 165 Reasonable
people can make reasonable mistakes, but not unreasonable ones.
Logically, there is a third alternative that, under the law of
evidence, inadvertent disclosure never results in a waiver even though
the party acts unreasonably because there is no subjective intention to
waive if the disclosure was inadvertent. Under this view, one cannot
waive the privilege without specifically intending to do so. 166 That
position would allow lawyers and clients to act unreasonably and still
secure the benefits of the attorney-client privilege. Such a rule does not
comply with the general principle that the party claiming the privilege
must be engaged in a confidential communication and must take
reasonable precautions
that indicate the communication is, in
167
fact, confidential.
E. Applying the Law of Evidence to the MisdirectedFax or Email
Now, let us apply the law of evidence to the case of the misdirected
fax, or the email mistakenly sent by the client, or lawyer, or their agents.
Whether the opposing lawyer or party could use the information sent to
them by the adversary will depend on how the law of evidence treats this
turnover. If the issue arises in a jurisdiction where the courts will not

testimony of an eavesdropper who overheard client-lawyer conversation in a crowded courthouse
hallway was admissible because neither the client nor the lawyer made any effort to ensure secrecy);
see also People v. Harris, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that a police officer may
testify to a statement he inadvertently overheard the defendant blurt out to her lawyer over the
telephone).
165. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1246
(D. Md. 1995).
166. One can find general and broad language in several -cases that appears to support that
position. Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1983) (stating
that an "inadvertent" disclosure does not operate as a waiver of the privilege unless the "failure to
catch" the document prior to its production in a mass of documents was a "deliberate" act or "the
result of conscious but erroneous decision"); see also Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18
F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Shields, the court used expansive language in holding that no
waiver occurred:
One of their counsel... swears that any documents seen and copied by plaintiffs were
permitted to be disclosed only by inadvertence.... [Counsel], in defendants' behalf,
stated on the record that such documents should never have been seen by plaintiffs and
that defendants intended no waiver. I find that plaintiffs' acquisition of these documents
was not under such circumstances as to constitute a waiver by defendant.
Id. In this case, the party communicated the information in the presence of a third party, thus
indicating that the information was not confidential. Id.
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
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apply the privilege, no matter how careful the parties were, then the
lawyer receiving the information should have no problem using it.
It would be similar to the case where the law of evidence in a
particular jurisdiction holds inadmissible a certain type of hearsay, even
though most jurisdictions allow that hearsay. Assume that plaintiffs
lawyer asks a question calling for this type of hearsay and the opposing
lawyer does not object, perhaps because the opposing lawyer mistakenly
thinks that this jurisdiction would allow for the hearsay. The plaintiffs
lawyer will have no ethical qualms if she uses the hearsay. The issue for
the plaintiffs lawyer is not 16an
issue of the law of ethics; it is only an
8
issue of the law of evidence.
F. Applying the Law ofEthics to the MisdirectedFax or Email
Rule 4.4 of the Model Rules treats the issue of the misdirected fax
or email as one of ethics. 169 It acknowledges that it does not address
whether the information retains its "privileged" status. 170 Therefore,
even if the document, testimony, electronic information, and so forth,
loses its privileged status under the law of evidence, the ABA
claims that the lawyer is still subject to discipline if she fails to
follow Rule 4.4.171
Moreover, even if the law of evidence finds that the inadvertent
disclosure serves to waive the privilege and "applicable law" does not
require the lawyer to return that document, the Model Rule claims that
"the decision [by the lawyer] to voluntarily return such a document
is a
172
matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer."'
That is an astonishing, illogical, and bewildering statement. The
privilege rule is paramount: if the sending lawyer's negligence causes
the evidence to lose its privileged status, then the receiving lawyer can
use it, just as he can take advantage of the opponent's failure to plead
168. In contrast, the opposing lawyer (the one who did not object) appears to have an issue
under the law of ethics-the issue of competence. See id. R. 1.1.
169. Id.R. 4.4.
170. Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
171. Id. R. 4.4; Trina Jones, InadvertentDisclosure of PrivilegedInformation and the Law of
Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J.

1255, 1272-73 (1999). Trina Jones notes that "courts tend to focus on the ultimate question of
waiver and on prospective use of the information," but in considering "the appropriateness of the
receiving side's behavior in reviewing and utilizing the material," the rules of waiver under the law
of evidence has "limited utility." Jones, supra, at 1272-73. On the other hand, Jones notes that

"clear resolution of the legal issue of whether disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege is
relevant to determining the ethical obligations of recipients of inadvertently disclosed information.
If inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege, then no ethical issue arises because there is nothing to

protect." Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted).
172.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2012).
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laches. 173 Yet the Reporter for Commission 20/20 actually says that,
"the degree of174the sender's negligence is typically irrelevant to the
ethics inquiry."
Let us assume that the document loses its evidentiary privilege
because we are in a jurisdiction that finds waiver if the lawyer or party
acted unreasonably. 17' The ABA actually claims that, under the law of
ethics, the lawyer-without securing any client consent-may refuse to
use highly relevant, admissible evidence that would significantly help
his client's case. 176 The client may waive its rights, but the client may be
surprised to know that the lawyer can waive it for the client and never
tell the client about it. 177
Remember, the other side inadvertently turns over a document that
is very damaging to their case. The court may well decide that, under the
law of evidence, the other side lost the attorney-client privilege, because
its inadvertence was negligent. 178 In fact, the lawyer will not really know
whether the court will hold that the other side's mistake was
"unreasonable" until the court rules on the claim. 179 That is because the
lawyer who receives the document will not know all the facts that led to
its disclosure. 180 The court will not know if the mistake was negligent
until after discovery and
a hearing, where the parties can present their
181
arguments to the court.
The ABA claims that, even if the law of evidence allows the lawyer
to use this damaging information because the other lawyer was
negligent, the lawyer receiving this information should not use it
because that is an area "of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to
the lawyer.' ' 182 To support this claim, the ABA cites Rule 1.4, but that
Rule says the exact opposite-that the lawyer "shall promptly consult
with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to

173. Seeid.R. 4.4.
174. Andrew M. Perlman, The Legal Ethics of MetadataMining, 43 AKRON L. REv. 785, 796
(2010). Professor Perlman was the Chief Reporter for ABA Commission 20/20. James Podgers,
Ethics 20/20 Commission Hones Proposals Going to the ABA House of Delegates, ABA JOURNAL
1:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ethics20 20
(Nov.
1, 2011,
commission hones_proposalsgoing_to theaba house-of delegates.
175. We might be in a jurisdiction that holds that even a reasonable mistake results in loss of
the privilege. The same analysis applies to that situation.
176.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2012).

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See FED. R. EvID. 502.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.
R. 1.2, 1.4).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2012) (citing id.
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be accomplished."'' 83 The ABA also cites Rule 1.2, which says
substantially the same thing, and thus does not support the ABA's
position in Rule 4.4. 184
Let us assume the lawyer complies with Rules 1.2 and 1.4, and
therefore consults with the client about this document. The conversation
would go something like this:
The other side made a mistake and turned over to us a document that is
very damaging to their case and very helpful to ours. The opposing law
firm may claim that it is privileged, but the court would likely rule that
it lost its privilege because the lawyers or client were negligent. I
would like to return the document and not use it. Do you agree? By the
way, if we return this document, it will hurt our case. Oh, by the way,
the opposing law firm made another mistake: it filed a compulsory
counterclaim. The law firm calculated the days incorrectly and
therefore missed the statute of limitations by a day. I would like to
waive that argument too, because that would not be sporting. 185
Any reasonable client would like to know why he should waive a valid
argument. Perhaps the client could secure some benefit from the adverse
party by agreeing not to use this document. Or, perhaps the parties
already agreed that they would return to each other (and
not use) any
1 86
errors.
unreasonable
even
error,
in
documents produced
On the other hand, if the client is securing no benefit by returning
the document, then the party who benefits from the other side's
negligence might well prefer to take advantage of the adversary's
mistake for the same reason that the client would prefer not to waive the
statute of limitations. After all, the point of the lawsuit from the
perspective of the litigant is to win. Most litigants would not understand
why they should not use a document that has lost its privilege, and that is
because most lawyers would not be able to offer an explanation.
183. Id. R. 1.4(a)(2) (emphasis added).
184. See id. R. 1.2(a) (stating that a lawyer shall, "as required by Rule 1.4.... consult with the
client as to the means by which [its objectives] are to be pursued"); id. R. 4.4. cmt. 3.
185. After I created this hypothetical conversation, I discovered that Professor Freedman
created a somewhat similar conversation. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supranote 17, app. C, at C-402
to C-403.
186. In document-intensive litigation, parties sometimes consent to "claw-back agreements,"
which "allow parties to forego a privilege review ... in favor of an agreement to return
inadvertently produced privileged documents." Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280,
290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235, 244 (D. Md.
2005) (quoting EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 287-88 (4th ed. 2001)) (stating that parties are not excused from undertaking
any preproduction privilege review based on their having negotiated a "nonwaiver" electronic
records production agreement, and further, that parties are free to contract around the general rule

that partial disclosure on a given subject matter will require total disclosure).
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Moreover, litigants would not understand what authorizes the lawyer to
conclude that waiving an important right of the client' 87
is an "area of
lawyer.'
the
to
reserved
ordinarily
judgment
professional
The ABA sees this issue as one of legal ethics, not of the law of
evidence.18 8 Rule 4.4 explicitly provides that it governs this situation, no
matter how the court might decide the evidence question. 189 Yet, the
question whether the document accidentally turned over loses is
privilege under the law of evidence is the crucial question-the only
real question. 90
Consider this thought experiment. The plaintiffs lawyer
accidentally produces in discovery a damaging, privileged document.
The ABA claims that the defendant's lawyer, when he discovers his
opponent's mistake, has the discretion as "a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer" to "choose to return the
document unread."' 9' Now, assume the same facts except that the
defendant is pro se. While the defendant's lawyer must follow the
procedures of Rule 4.4 and has the right to refuse to use the document
without securing his client's consent, the pro se litigant does not labor
under that burden. 192 The ABA is seeking to impose a burden on clients
who are not pro se. 193 Pro se litigants
carry no similar burden; they only
94
have to follow the law of evidence.
The principle that the ABA appears to embrace is that people do not
read the mail of other people, 195 even if the other person (mistakenly but
voluntarily) places the opened letter on your desk. That principle is
counter to the prime directive of the ABA Model Rules and our
adversary system of justice. 196 As Professor Monroe Freedman has
astutely noted:

187.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2012).

188. See id.R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
189. Id. (stating that "the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been
waived" is "beyond the scope of these Rules").
190. See id.
191. Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 3.
192. See id. R. 4.4; Paula J. Frederick, Learning to Live with Pro Se Opponents, GPSoLO,
Oct.-Nov. 2005, at 48, 49-52.
193. See Frederick, supranote 192, at 50-52.
194. See id.
195. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson said, "gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail."
Stephen Glain, Op-Ed., Defense Secretary Robert Gates's Missed Opportunity, U.S. NEWS, May 19,

2011,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/stephen-glain/2011/05/19/defense-secretary-robertgatess-missed-opportunity. Stinson supposedly said this in 1929 when he shut down the office in the
U.S. Department of State then responsible for breaking coded messages between embassies of other
countries and their capitals. Id.
196.

See id; see also, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012).
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The lawyer's fiduciary obligation to her own client is one of
several ethical duties that are often ignored or minimized
in discussions of erroneous disclosure of damaging information.
Indeed, some discussions of civility and professionalism seem to
fiduciary duty runs not to her client but to her
suggest that the lawyer's
97
"brother lawyers."
Nowhere else do the Model Rules provide that lawyers should protect

adversary lawyers from the risks of their malpractice liability. Yet, here
the Rules provide that lawyers-but not pro se98 litigants-may not take
advantage of the mistakes of their adversaries.
This position is even more mysterious when we consider that, in.
similar circumstances, the Model Rules place no restriction on one
lawyer taking advantage of his adversary's mistake, whether reasonable
or not. For example, if a client voluntarily reveals a portion of his
privileged communications, courts typically find that he may not

withhold the remainder.

99

One cannot open the door a crack; once a

litigant has started to divulge his privileged communications with his

lawyer, he cannot slam the door shut.200 Some courts even find a
permanent loss of the evidentiary privilege if the client or lawyer
inadvertently discloses part of the privileged communication. 20 They

argue that, "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the
attorney-client communications like jewels-if not
confidentiality 20of
2
crown jewels."

197. Freedman, supranote 128, at 180.
198. Id. at 179. In discussing erroneous disclosure, Professor Freedman notes that:
[T]he principal concern that lawyers have with taking advantage of an adversary's error
is that the lawyer who has committed the error may be subject to a malpractice action by
his client should the client find out....
One of the clearest expressions of this collegial conspiracy is in an article by
Lawrence Fox titled, "Take Care of Each Other," in which Fox argues that a lawyer
receiving a misdirected fax should not read it, much less use it for the benefit of her own
client.
Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted) (citing Lawrence J. Fox, Take Care of Each Other, LITIGATION, Fall
1995, at 1, 1-2).
199. See FED. R. EviD.502.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here, in more detail, the court
explained that:
The courts will grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their
own precautions warrant. We therefore agree with those courts which have held that the
privilege is lost "'even if disclosure is inadvertent."'
•..[l]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of the
attorney-client communication like jewels-if not crown jewels. Short of courtcompelled disclosure.., or other equally extraordinary circumstances, we will not
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The case law does not support the ABA position. Consider S.E.C. v.
Cassano.2 °3 In the course of disclosing many documents at its office, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") inadvertently included a
nearly one hundred-page draft of its "action memo," which discussed its
evidence, analyzed its legal theories, and laid out the strengths and
weaknesses of its case.2 °4 Normally, the work product privilege protects
this document.2 5 When the defense counsel saw the document, he asked
the SEC for a copy. 20 6 The SEC paralegal asked the responsible lawyer
whether to copy it, and the lawyer (who did not ask what it was)
obliged. 20 7 Another twelve days passed before the SEC discovered its
mistake and tried to get the document back.20 8
Cassanoheld that this bell simply could not be unrung. 20 9 The court
concluded that, "[a]lthough the SEC acted promptly once it determined
the document had been produced,.., the time taken to rectify the error,
in all the circumstances, was excessive., 2'0 As a result of the SEC's
carelessness, the court denied its motion to require defense counsel to
return the memorandum.2 1'
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.212 is yet another case
reaching the same conclusion. Defense counsel inadvertently produced a
box of over 3200 pages of privileged material among boxes with 70,000
pages of unprivileged material.2t 3 The court first discussed three
different alternatives to deal with this issue.214 Thefirst alternative is the
"never waived" rule, which would require returning the documents.2 15
Second is the "strict accountability" rule, which would treat all such
situations as waivers.2 16 The third, or middle ground, is the position of
the ALl, which looks at the circumstances to determine whether the
distinguish between various degrees of "voluntariness" in waivers of the attorney-client
privilege.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352,
1356 (4th Cir. 1984)) (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir.
1978)).
203. 189 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
204. Id.at 83-84.
205. See FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2).
206. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. at 84.
207. Id.at 84-85.
208. Id.at 85.
209. Id. at 86.
210. Id.
211. Id.
2!2. 190 F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000).
213. Id.at 288-89.
214. Id.at290-91.
215. Id.at 290.
216. Id.at290-91.
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mistake was reasonable.217 Under the third alternative, the court looks at
"(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent inadvertent
disclosure, (2) the amount of time it took the producing party to
recognize its error, (3) the scope of the production, (4) the extent of the
inadvertent disclosure, and (5) the overriding interest of fairness and
justice."2" 8 In this case, the defendant did not realize what had happened
until the plaintiff called the situation to its attention, and little could be
done to avoid damage.2 19
Amgen held that the defendant waived the privilege because it
would be unjust to reward counsel's "gross negligence.,

220

Lawyers

must treat confidential papers with reasonable care, or the court is likely
to treat the privilege as surrendered.2 2' Ultimately, the lawyer can
comply with the law of evidence and avoid malpractice by notifying the
court and asking it to determine if the opposing party has waived the
privilege.222 When the lawyer asks the court to determine if the
documents have lost their privilege, he or she will also be complying
with Rule 4.4(b).223
G. The Influence of the ABA on InadvertentFaxes andEmails
It may be no coincidence that the ABA ignored this issue until the
advent of new technology. For years, lawyers have been making
mistakes, and, as the prior discussion showed, the courts simply decided
those cases based on the law of evidence.2 24 Then came high technology.
First, this changed the nature of discovery.2 25 Now, the chances of
mistakes, whether reasonable or unreasonable, increase when parties
seek thousands of electronic documents.226 In addition, with the slip of a
217.
218.
219.

Id. at291.
Id. (citing City of Worcester v. HCA Mgmt. Co., 839 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D. Mass. 1993)).
Id.at 292-93.

220. Id at 293.
221.
222.
223.

Seeid.
See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
Model Rule 4.4(b) provides that a "lawyer who receives a document or electronically

stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably
should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012) (emphasis

added).
224. See supra Part III.D.
225. See DAVID KERWIN, DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, at xiii-xiv (2005), available
at http://www.apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5310341 chap I _abs.pdf.

226. Lawyers use computer programs that employ algorithms to determine whether documents
are relevant to a case. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in
E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH.

J.L. & TECH. 11, 15-19 (2011); see also Joe Palazzolo, How a Computer Did the Work of Many
Lawyers, WALL ST. J.

L. BLOG

(Jan.

17,

2013,

4:44
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finger, one can broadcast a fax to the wrong party or transmit an
inadvertent email to an entire listserv.227 A cynic might conclude that
when lawyers in big firms were as likely to make mistakes as solo
practitioners, the ABA became concerned.
As in the case of chat rooms, the ABA has not been as influential as
it would like. The ABA issued three Opinions on the topic of lawyers
who have received misdirected faxes.228 In the earliest of these Opinions,
Formal Opinion 92-368, the ABA opined that, when a lawyer receives a
fax that the opposing lawyer has clearly sent inadvertently, the lawyer
should refrain from reviewing the materials, notify the sending lawyer,
and abide by that lawyer's instructions. 229 The lawyer who followed that
advice may find himself a defendant in a malpractice action, as
discussed above.230
Two years later came Formal Opinion 94-382.231 The ABA realized
that, sometimes, a whistle-blower or disgruntled employee will
intentionally send the fax or email to the adversary.232 Under those
circumstances, said the ABA, the lawyer should either inform the
adversary's lawyer and follow her instructions, or refrain from using the
unsolicited material until a court makes a definitive resolution of the
proper disposition of the materials.233
These two ABA Formal Opinions distinguished between situations
where the lawyer or client sent the fax inadvertently, compared to the
situation where a disgruntled employee (or whistle-blower) sent the
information advertently.234 That raises another issue: in some cases, the
receiving lawyer will not know if the sender is a disgruntled employee or
an inattentive one. Not all whistle-blowers announce their intention in

law/2013/01/17/how-a-computer-did-the-work-of-many-lawyers/?mod=djemlawblogh (noting that
a computer turned over 170,000 documents to opposing counsel, took only 7 months, and cost
merely $200,000, which is a good deal considering that, if humans had reviewed these documents,
the cost would have exceeded $1 million).
227.

Thomas J. Hall & Rosa V. Estrella, Privilegeand the ErrantEmail, J. PROPRIETARY RTS.,

Apr.
2000,
at
2,
2,
available at
http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/
24bd 16e4-ae4a-43ec-925f-b47cbf488ece/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3d83ac 16-e8ed-43b6af0O-b63a6885e227/hallarticle.pdf.
228. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profi Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006); ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
229. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994).
232.

Id.

233. Id.
234. Compare id, with ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992).
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the cover memorandum attached to the fax. 235 Some whistle-blowers do
not attach their names to the documents.2 36
In response, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers has advised that it "is not a violation to accept the advantage of
inadvertent, and even negligent, disclosure of confidential information
by the other lawyer, if the effect of the other lawyer's action is to waive
'
In addition
the right of that lawyer's client to assert confidentiality."237
to the Restatement, many state Bar Opinions and court cases rejected the
ABA solution.2 38 The ABA view of the Model Rules was not the model
that many states embraced.239
Consequently, in 2005, the ABA withdrew Formal Opinion 92-368
because the language in Model Rule 4.4, as modified by the ABA after
1992, conflicted with the outdated Opinion: "Rule 4.4(b) thus only
obligates the receiving lawyer to notify the sender of the inadvertent
transmission promptly. The rule does not require the receiving lawyer
either to refrain from examining the materials or to abide by the
instructions of the sending lawyer., 240 As for the lawyer or her agent
sending the material inadvertently, they should obviously avoid the
problem by taking reasonable care to ensure that they do not misdirect
faxes or emails. 24' Then, the sender can hope to take advantage of the
general trend in the law that holds that inadvertent disclosure does not
waive the attorney-client privilege if the lawyer and client have taken
reasonable precautions to guard against inadvertent disclosure. 242 What

235. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
(discussing similar state ethics opinions that use wording such as "unidentified source" and
"unknown third party" instead of whistle-blower).
236. Id.
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. e (2000).
238. See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 18 Cal. App. 4th 996, 1005-06 (Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that, even if the documents were sent inadvertently, the lawyer who received
them through no wrongdoing on his part may keep them and need not inform opposing counsel).
239. See, e.g., id.; see also Va. State Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Op. 1076 (1988), available at
http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1076.htm (stating that the lawyer may retain, read, and make use of
material from his opponent's file that was sent to him by an unknown third party).
240. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
241. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 16-17 (2012). If the fax is misdirected,
then both the receiving lawyer and the sending lawyer must turn to their local jurisdiction to
determine what happens next under the law of evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 502(b).
242. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co., v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 652
(9th Cir. 1978) (holding no waiver by inadvertent disclosure under circumstances involving
seventeen million pages of documents with a "demanding timetable" and "logistical difficulties").
But see Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 458 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that the law firm's inadvertent disclosure of two privileged documents among forty boxes that were
released amounted to a waiver of the attomey-client privilege).
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is "reasonable" depends on the circumstances, including the sensitivity
of the information.24 3
We know, from the discussion above, that some courts will allow
the receiving lawyer (the first lawyer) to take advantage of the sending
lawyer's mistake (the second lawyer), even if the mistaken disclosure
was not negligent. 2 " Other courts will only allow the first lawyer to take
advantage of the second lawyer's error if that inadvertent disclosure was
not negligent. 245 Hence, it makes the most sense for the first lawyer to
inform the court and the second lawyer (which is what Rule 4.4,
Comment 2 now advises), in order to secure a court ruling.246 If the
court rules that the inadvertent disclosure did not waive the privilege, the
first lawyer cannot take advantage of her opponent's mistake without
fear that her client will criticize her for failure to prosecute the
case zealously. And, if the court concluded that the inadvertent
disclosure serves to waive the privilege, the first lawyer can take
advantage of her opponent's mistake without worrying that she is
violating any ethical rule.
IV.

INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSED METADATA

A. Introduction:ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 and Metadata
Metadata is information embedded in a computer-created document
that one can find in the computer code.247 Often, we can discover it with
little effort, such as by clicking "show markup" in a Microsoft Word
document. The metadata may tell us the author or authors of a document,
when the authors created it, what prior versions of the document looked
like, and so forth. A computer expert will be able to uncover even more
information about the document.248
The concept of "inadvertently" disclosed metadata is a peculiar one.
The 2012 revisions to the Comments of Rule 4.4 introduced the strange
concept that an obligation is created under this Rule only if the receiving
lawyer knows or should know that the metadata was inadvertently
sent. 249 It is "inadvertent" if the lawyer "accidentally" included
243.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt. h (2000).

244. See supra Part IE.
245. See supra Part lI.E.
246. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2012).
247. Perlman, supra note 174, at 786.
248. Sometimes the other party may find this metadata of great interest because, for example, a
redlined change may suggest how much more the opposing party is willing to pay for a settlement.
The date that someone created a document may also be important for discovery purposes. Id. at 792.
249. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2013).
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"electronically stored information with information that was
intentionally transmitted., 250 Yet, as commentators have pointed out,
"[t]he 'fact' that counsel did not intend the lawyer to receive the
'hidden' information is therefore not at all obvious, since by exercising
reasonable care the counsel
would have reviewed and removed such
251
material at her discretion."
Should there be a different rule when the sending lawyer is sending
an electronic document advertently, but the lawyer does not know that
the document also contains metadata? Should this different rule apply
even though any lawyer, "by exercising reasonable care," could just
remove the metadata? The ABA Comment to Rule 4.4 says no.252 If the
lawyer intentionally sends a document that includes metadata (the "track
changes" option allows the receiving lawyer to read earlier versions of
the document), and the sending lawyer does not realize that he sent a
document with track changes embedded in the document, then the
receiving lawyer must promptly notify the sending lawyer and/or return
the document.253
If the lawyer were sending a hard copy-a non-electronic
document-advertently, the other party can certainly examine data
embedded in the hard copy, like fingerprints, even though the other
lawyer did not intentionally transmit the fingerprints. 254 It is irrelevant

that the sending lawyer did not intend to send the fingerprints. No one
has ever raised an ethical problem with looking at fingerprints. Why
should the rule be different if we are considering digital "fingerprints"?
There is a simple solution to that issue, and it is the answer in
Formal Opinion 06-442.255 This Opinion concluded that the Model Rules
250. Id.
251. David Hricik & Robert R. Jueneman, The Transmission and Receipt of Invisible
ConfidentialInformation, PROF. LAW., Spring 2004, at 18, 20.
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2013).

253. Id.
254. See id
255. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006). A
Pennsylvania Bar Association Ethics Opinion thoroughly canvassed various ethical opinions dealing
with mining metadata and concluded the following:
[U]nder the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, each attorney must determine
for himself or herself whether to utilize the metadata contained in documents and other
electronic files based upon the lawyer's judgment and the particular factual situation.
This determination should be based upon the nature of the information received, how
and from whom the information was received, attorney-client privilege and work product
rules, and common sense, reciprocity and professional courtesy. Although the waiver of
the attorney-client privilege with respect to privileged and confidential materials is a
matter for judicial determination, the Committee believes that the inadvertent
transmissions of such materials should not constitute a waiver of the privilege, except in
the case of extreme carelessness or indifference.
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do not prohibit lawyers from discovering and using metadata found in
documents that other lawyers transmit to them, even though the other
lawyer may not know that the electronic version of the document
contains metadata. 256 The Commission 20/20 Report to the ABA House
of Delegates cited to this Opinion and then announced that the
Commission's proposal permits lawyers to look at metadata, "at least
under certain
circumstances
(for example, with the opponent's or a
,
• •
,,257
court's permission).
However, that is not what ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 said. 258 It
imposes no such restriction. 25 9 The Report to the ABA does not explain
why it is rejecting the ABA's own Formal Opinion. 260 ABA Formal
Opinion 06-442 advised, in contrast to Commission 20/20, that lawyers
who do not wish to give metadata to their opponents should avoid
creating the metadata in the first place. 261 For example, they might
decide not to use the redlining function in a word processing program, or
they might not embed comments in a document.262 Lawyers may also
fax a copy of the document, or they may only provide a hard copy to the
adversary.263 Alternatively, the lawyers can use computer software
programs to scrub metadata from a document before they email it to
their opponents.264 It is the duty of the lawyer to "safeguard information
relating to the representation,, 265 assuming, of course, that the evidence

Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2007-500 (2007)
(emphasis added).
256. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006); see also Md.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket No. 2007-09 (2007), available at
http://www.icw.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/LawLibrary/CourtRulesArticles/MarylandEOonM
etadata.pdf. The Maryland Opinion concluded, after citing the 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with electronic discovery, that, because Maryland did not adopt
ABA Model Rule 4.4(b), lawyers who receive electronic discovery materials have no ethical duty to
refrain from viewing or using metadata and no obligation to inform their adversary. Md. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket No. 2007-09 (2007).
257. COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supranote 13, at 6.
258. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
259. Id.
260. See COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-7.
261. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2012)); see also N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004) (stating that, to the extent that metadata
contains confidential client information, a lawyer must exercise reasonable care not to disclose
confidential client information, and such care may require that the lawyer keep up with
technological advances to "clean" the metadata from the electronic file).
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does not have forensic value.266 Altering a document would constitute
obstruction of justice under some circumstances.26 7
One would think that should end the matter. However, Commission
20/20 had a different view. 268 It rejected ABA Formal Opinion 06-442
and announced that henceforth, "if a lawyer uncovers metadata that the
lawyer knows the sending lawyer did not intend to include, Model
Rule 4.4(b)'s notification requirement is triggered., 269 In other words,
even when the sending lawyer intentionally turns over a document but
acts negligently and does not take care to remove metadata (assuming
such removal does not obstruct
evidence), the receiving lawyer must
"promptly notify the sender. ' 270
B.

The 2012 Changes to the Comments

Let us now look at the Comments to Rule 4.4 that create this new
notification requirement. These Comments impose a very different duty
on the lawyer who receives an electronic document that the opposing
party intentionally sent him, when the opposing party somehow did not
know that it contained metadata 2zT
In 2012, the ABA amended Rule 4.4, Comments 2 and 3 to protect
the turnover of metadata embedded in a computer-generated

266. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (emphasizing
that, when responding to discovery, in regards to a document with forensic interest, "a lawyer must
not alter a document when it would be unlawful or unethical to do so, e.g., Rule 3.4(a)").
267. See id.
268. See COMMiSSiON 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
269. Id.
270. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (2013) (defining "inadvertent" as
including a document that the sender turned over quite intentionally).
271. Professor Freedman offers an excellent example of the ABA's preference to treat
metadata much more favorably than analogue data:
[T]ake an actual case, where a defense lawyer in a personal injury case checked his voice
mail one morning and found on it a message from the plaintiff himself, who thought he
was calling his own lawyer but had mistakenly called the. defense lawyer. What the
plaintiff said was, "Is it okay if I shoot some baskets with the guys? I thought I should
ask you because you got so angry with me when I went bowling."
Now, does anybody have any question about whether that admission by the plaintiff
can be used? Why is it different, then, if the same kind of information comes in a
misdirected e-mail or in metadata that has been mined, or in a misdirected fax from the
lawyer for the plaintiff saying, for example, "I understand you went bowling. If you ever
do anything like that again, you're going to have to find another lawyer. I have told you
that they are going to be watching and we can't afford to have them catch you." Why
should that not be useable just as much as when it comes from the client, from the
principal, himself?
Monroe H. Freedman, Whatever Happenedto the Search for Truth?, 60 MERCER L. REv. 851, 854
(2008).
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document.272 The drafters claimed that they were treating metadata
similar to conventional documents.273
That is incorrect. The Comments treat digital data quite differently
from what we can call analogue data, that is, plain old hard copy
paper.274 The Resolution that contains Commission 20/20's proposed
changes underlines the new language and marks the deleted language
with stikeet'a. Note the following Commission 20/20 changes displayed
in Comments 2 and 3 to Rule 4.4:
[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a
documents or electronically stored information that wee was
mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A
document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent
when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or letter is
misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is
accidentally included with information that was intentionally
transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such
a document or electronically stored information was sent
inadvertently, then [Rule 4.4] requires the lawyer to promptly notify
the sender in order to permit that person to take protective
measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps,
such as returning the document or electronically stored information
originala ....... ,is a matter of law beyond the scope of these
Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a
document or electronically stored information has been waived.
Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who
receives a document or electronically stored information that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been vffeng.-lly
inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this
Rule, "document or electronically stored information" includes, in
addition to paper documents, email and other forms of electronically
stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to
as "metadata"), that is email or other electrenic medes of
t an.ssreie subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata
in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if
the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.
[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document or
electronically stored information unread, for example, when the lawyer
learns before receiving it the de......t that it was inadvertently sent
to the vfreng add s. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable

272.

COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.

273. See id.
274. See COMMISSION 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 6, at 5-6.
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law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document
or electronically stored information is a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.275
C. Applying Rule 4.4, Comments 2 and 3
Lawyers have pointed out that they should have a right to examine
a file for metadata, just as they could examine a paper document to
determine the age of the paper, or to see if someone has altered it, or to
discover fingerprints.276 Let us apply Rule 4.4, Comments 2 and 3 to two
hypothetical situations: one involving a hard copy document, and one
involving an electronic document. For simplicity, we can refer to the
first group of documents as analogue (hard copy), and the second group
as digital (computer-generated, containing metadata). How do Rule 4.4
and the 2012 changes to its Comments treat those two situations?
1. Analogue Data and Digital Data Embedded in Documents
Consider this situation (which comes from an actual, unpublished
case). A lawyer ("Alpha") sues his former client ("Client") for unpaid
fees. Alpha claims that he kept careful contemporaneous handwritten
time records in ink over the course of a year, and those records support
his case. Client subpoenas Alpha's billing records. Alpha does not know
that his paper records have embedded data in them, the analogue version
of metadata. The Client's lawyer hires an expert who advises Client and
his lawyer that the longer ink is on a paper, the deeper the ink sets into
the paper. The expert mines this information, which shows that Alpha
did not mark his hours contemporaneously, day by day, over the course
of a year. Instead, the transfer of the ink through the paper shows that
Alpha wrote down all of his billable hours on the same recent day (based
on how much the ink seeped through each page).
Pursuant to the subpoena, Alpha intentionally turned over the
billing records. He did not know about ink seeping through a page, and
only expert investigation of the document could uncover this seepage.
Still, neither Rule 4.4 nor any other ethics rule prohibits the Client's
lawyer from retaining an expert to mine data on the hard copy
document.27 7 Nothing in Rule 4.4 remotely requires that the Client's
lawyer ask for Alpha's permission before mining the data. If the expert
finds information (for example, Alpha did not enter the data over the
275. Id.
276. Jessica M. Walker, Not So Evident: Lawyers Are Learning that What They Don't Know
About Metadata Can Hurt Their Clients and Cases, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REv., Apr. 17, 2006, at 4.
277.

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2013).
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course of a year) that is useful, Rule 4.4(b) does not require the lawyer
"to promptly notify the sender," for example, the lawyer representing
Alpha, who responded to the subpoena. 278 The adverse party
intentionally turned over the billing records, even though he did not
advertently intend to turn over the embedded information.279
Other law, such as civil procedure or evidence rules, may require, at
some point, that Alpha's lawyer make disclosures to the plaintiff.
However, the law of ethics, properly understood, requires
no
2 80
notification; much less does it require any "prompt notification.
We can consider a variant of this hypothetical situation, instead
occurring in the period before any litigation commences. Client
complains that the fees are excessive and his lawyer, Alpha, threatens to
sue Client if the fees are not paid. Client asks Alpha for the billing
records, and Alpha shows them to Client. Client then consults another
lawyer ("Second Lawyer") for her opinion as to whether the fees are
excessive. Second Lawyer gives the billing records to the expert who
discovers, after complicated testing, that Alpha did not prepare the
billing records contemporaneously as he had claimed, but all on the
same day. Second Lawyer confronts Alpha with the information and
Alpha agrees to drop his claim for unpaid legal fees. Nothing in the
Model Rules suggests that Second Lawyer did anything unethical.
Indeed, we should congratulate her for very competent work that saved
her Client the need to litigate.
Now, let us turn to the digital equivalent of this analogue data. We
can assume the same facts as the prior paragraph, except that Alpha kept
his billing records on a computer. Hence, Alpha turns over a copy of the
computerized records. Rule 4.4, Comment 2 apparently requires Second
Lawyer "to promptly notify" Alpha before mining the electronic
document because Alpha did not specifically intend to send the
metadata: he sent it "accidentally., 281 Of course, promptly notifying
Alpha gives Alpha the time to create or invent an explanation to explain
the metadata. Moreover, Second Lawyer would prefer to hire the expert

278. See id
279. Consider, also, State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007). The Washington Supreme
Court effectively held that an ostensible client's saliva, which he used to seal a letter to an
ostensible lawyer (as distinct, say, from saliva given to the lawyer to run a DNA test) does not
constitute a confidential communication. Id. at 33. The case did not involve Model Rule 4.4(b),
although the court did hold that (1) the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
(under the Fourth Amendment) in the saliva he put on envelope, and (2) the detectives did not
violate due process or any other constitutional right when they posed as lawyers creating a fictitious
law firm to obtain the defendant's DNA. Id. at 34-44.
280. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2013).
281. Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
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first (before notifying Alpha), and see if the expert finds anything. If the
billing records are in order and do not appear excessive, Client may
simply wish to pay and not even tell Alpha that Client doubted Alpha's
bona fides.
If the situation involved litigation that has already commenced,
Rule 4.4, Comment 2 imposes burdens regarding the embedded
metadata that do not apply to the embedded data in hard copy.282 When
a lawyer requests the production of computer files or hard drives in
discovery, and the electronic files contain metadata that provides
confidential information about changes made by the client, we should
not think that the lawyer inadvertently disclosed this information. Often,
the whole point of subpoenaing a computer document, or computer disk,
or a hard drive is to see the metadata. Yet, the revised Comment 2
sneaks in a new definition of "inadvertent," a definition one does not
find in the Terminology section of the Model Rules, where one would
normally expect to find it.2 83 Instead, the following Comment in Rule 4.4
creates a new definition, which only applies to Rule 4.4:
A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently
sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or
letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored
information is accidentally
included with information that was
284
intentionally transmitted.
This sentence is entirely new. The first clause offers the normal
definition of "inadvertently sent," such as mailing a letter to the wrong
person or mailing an email to the wrong person. 85 The second clause is
not a natural definition of "inadvertent., 286 One party subpoenas or
requests a computer document, and the other party intentionally turns it
over but negligently forgets to scrub the metadata from the document.
The ABA allows lawyers to examine a hard copy document for
fingerprints, but prohibits them from examining a computer-generated
document for digital fingerprints
unless they first promptly notify the
287
opposing party and warn them.
Let us apply this new ABA definition to our factual situation. We
assume that, pursuant to the subpoena, Alpha turns over the computer
billing records, and Client's lawyer hires a computer expert to mine the

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id.
Id.;see also id.
R. 1.0.
Id.R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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data. Rule 4.4, Comment 2 apparently requires Second Lawyer "to
promptly notify" Alpha before mining the electronic document because
the metadata was sent "accidentally., 288 Of course, promptly notifying
Alpha gives Alpha time to create an explanation to explain the metadata.
It also warns Alpha that he has to be careful to scrub the next set of
computer documents. Moreover, this warning requirement applies even
though Client may not want Alpha to know that he is mining because
that investigation may not turn up anything on this particular document
and he does not want Alpha to know what he has been doing.
Let us consider yet another variant of this hypothetical--one that
does not involve litigation, at least not yet. Again, our hypothetical can
include an analogue and a digital version of the embedded metadata.
Assume we have a pro se individual, prone to litigation, who has filed
many pro se lawsuits. We can assume that she (let us call her "Jane Poe"
or "Poe") is so litigious that the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has enjoined her from filing further litigation. Jane Poe
mails a letter to a lawyer ("Beta") living in Virginia, threatening to sue
Beta for defamation because of a comment Beta made that a
Pennsylvania newspaper later published. Beta had discussed the judicial
decision enjoining Poe from filing more lawsuits in Massachusetts.
Poe's letter says that she is acting pro se, worried about her reputation,
and will sue Beta for defamation unless he apologizes in writing. Poe is
litigious and so Beta is concerned that it will be expensive for him,
living in Virginia, to hire a lawyer to defend the threatened lawsuit in
Pennsylvania. However, he does not want to apologize because he
knows that he can prove his comments were truthful.
Assume that Poe emails a copy of the letter to Beta in Microsoft
Word format. Then, Beta can look at the metadata (one can see some
data quite easily by clicking on the "File" tab, and then clicking "Info"
to view the document's properties). Beta discovers from the metadata
that Poe is not really pro se and that another lawyer was the real author
of the document. Poe discovered that this other lawyer had a particular
personal agenda against Beta. Beta then responds to Poe and explains
that she appears to be less than candid when she says that she is acting
pro se because another person is the real author of the letter. Beta says
that her threats ring hollow for various reasons, one of which is that she
appears to be lying about her motive. The facts in this hypothetical
situation are derived from a real case that never came to litigation,
because Poe simply slipped away quietly after being confronted with
the facts.
288. Id.
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Did Beta violate any ethical duty when he mined the metadata
without first "promptly" notifying Poe? Rule 4.4, Comment 2 appears
to argue so.289 However, the Rule does not disclose the rationale for
its conclusion.
Now, consider the hard copy variant of this hypothetical. First, Poe
mails a hard copy to Beta, who hires someone to examine it for
fingerprints and discovers that there are fingerprints of a person other
than Poe on that letter. Further research shows that the fingerprints
belong to another lawyer-a disbarred lawyer on parole for fraud. That
type of data mining causes no issues under Rule 4.4.290 One can mine
data as long as it is not computer data.2 9' One type of mining is ethical
and the other is not, unless the lawyer promptly notifies the adversary,
which will warn him, give him time to develop a story, and allow him
time to scrub the data in the future.292
One of the unanswered questions that the drafters of Rule 4.4 do
not answer is why they want to give far greater protection to digital data
than analogue data, even when the lawyer mines that metadata to
uncover sharp practices.293 Granted, opponents of mining metadata
compare it to rummaging about the opponent's garbage or looking into
his briefcase when he takes a break from the deposition.294 However,
these analogies are false. The lawyer is not trespassing on the garbage or
the briefcase. The lawyer is merely examining the document that the
adversary intentionally turned over to him. Instead of examining the
document for analogue fingerprints, the lawyer is examining it for digital
fingerprints. Mining a digital document is no different from mining an
analogue document. The lawyer may use an ink specialist in one case
versus a computer specialist in the other. Neither case involves sneaking
into the opponent's briefcase or rummaging through his garbage.

289. See id
290. See id R. 4.4(b) & cmt. 2.
291. Id.
292. See id R. 4.4(b) & cmts. 2-3.
293. See id. R. 4.4(b) cmts. 1-3.
294. See David Hricik, Miningfor Embedded Data: Is It Ethical to Take IntentionalAdvantage
of Other People's Failures?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 231, 245-46 (2007) (arguing that it requires
active, deliberate steps to reveal the usually invisible confidential information embedded in an
electronic document, and that it borders on dishonesty); see also Ariz. State Bar Comm. on the
Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 07-03 (2007), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/
EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=695 (explaining that lawyers should not examine electronic
communications for the purpose of mining the metadata and that lawyers who discover metadata
that reveals confidential information must inform the sender); Lawyer Who Receives Electronic
Material May Not Try to Discover Hidden Metadata, 23 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
641,641 (Dec. 26, 2007).
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Let us consider another thought experiment. In the hypothetical
cases that we have been considering-the digital billing records, the
Microsoft Word letter threatening defamation-the lawyer is either
directly, or through an expert, mining data. Now, let us assume that the
client does not hire a lawyer but is acting pro se. There is no rule of
ethics, evidence, or procedure that prohibits the non-lawyer from mining
the data, digital or analogue, and there is no rule that requires the nonlawyer to notify anyone. The drafters of the changes to Model Rule 4.4
do not explain why they wish to give such a competitive advantage to
the layperson.
Let us vary this experiment a bit more. Now we assume that the
client has hired a lawyer, but the lawyer is not examining anything and
not hiring any expert. In the first case, the Client (who is suing Alpha,
his former attorney, for fees) asks his new lawyer to give Alpha's billing
records to him. The Client, after all, is the client, and he has a right to
look at the evidence. In the second case, where Poe threatens Beta for
defamation, let us now assume that Poe threatens a non-lawyer with
defamation. Poe, for example, may email this Microsoft Word document
to a news reporter. In both cases (the defendant-former client and the
reporter), the non-lawyer examines the metadata in the document. None
of that data mining is wrong in either case and the person examining the
document need not first inform the court.295
The Model Rules govern lawyers, not lay people, so the Model
Rules do not prevent Client from mining for metadata.296 Similarly, the
Model Rules do not prevent the news reporter from mining the
electronic document for metadata. In both cases, the law of evidence
would treat the data mining information as admissible. 297 In both cases,
no other law requires Client or the news reporter to promptly notify
either Alpha or the litigious Ms. Poe before beginning the data mining.
D. The Amendments to Rule 4.4 Versus the ABA FormalOpinions
1. Company Mining of Employees' Emails
Let us turn to two ABA Formal Opinions that relate to the issue of
mining metadata. The first, on the "Duty to Protect the Confidentiality of

295.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmts. 2-3 (2013).

296. STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3
(2013).
297. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2013) (citing id.
R. 1.2, 1.4).
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E-Mail

with One's

Client,"

is

ABA

Formal

Opinion 1 1-459.298

The typical situation involves employees who sue employers over
race discrimination, sexual harassment, and so forth. In such cases, the
employer often seeks access to the employee's email account so that it
can see the emails without issuing a formal request for documents.
Alternatively, a third party may subpoena the employer for emails by the
employee. In each case, the employee may have some expectation of
privacy, such as when the email account is a personal email account that
is password protected. The employer (or third party subpoenaing the
employer) may argue that it should be able to see these emails-without
respecting any privilege from the employee-because the server, on
which the emails are stored, is in the possession and control of
the employer.
The ABA has come down on the side of the employer. 299 Formal

Opinion 11-459 notes that:
[T]he employer may be able to obtain an employee's
communications from the employer's email server if the employee
uses a business e-mail address, or from a workplace computer or
other employer-owned telecommunications device on which the
even ifthe employee has used a separate,personal ee-mail is stored
300
account.
mail

The ABA's Formal Opinion does not impose any ethical duty on the
employer or its lawyer to notify the employee or the employee's lawyer,
even though it acknowledges that the employees may be unaware that
employers can access the employee's emails to their personal lawyeremails that may fall within the attorney-client privilege. 3 ' Instead,
Formal Opinion 11-459 imposes a duty on the employee's lawyer
to warn his or her client that the employer or third party can access
these emails. 302 Commission 20/20 does not explain why the
employer can rummage through the database without first notifying the
opposing counsel.30 3
The case law often does not follow the ABA on this issue. Consider
Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.304 The court treated the
employee's office computer as analogous to a file cabinet where the
298.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof lResponsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).

299.
300.
301.

See id
See id. (emphasis added).
Id.

302.

Id

303.
304.

See COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-6.
864 N.E.2d 1272 (N.Y. 2007).
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employee stored personal communications.3 °5 Thyroff held that an
employee or agent has a cause of action of conversion applicable to
intangible electronic records that are stored on a computer, and that these
30 6
records are indistinguishable from printed documents.
Cases often hold that an employee's emails are privileged if the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, which should
normally be the case if the employee used a password protected personal
email account.30 7 Granted, the email is in the employer's possession via
its server, but so is the employee's purse sitting unattended in the locked
office, even though the employer's janitor also has a key. The fact that
the employer can access the server, and even crack the password using
the wonders of its information technology experts, does not mean that
the material is freely available. That is particularly true if the employee
is communicating with her lawyer.
In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. 308 Marina Stengart, a
former employee, sued her employer for alleged discrimination.30 9 The
trial court denied plaintiff's motion seeking the return from the employer
of all copies of employee's emails sent from the plaintiff to her lawyers
through her personal email account, which was accessed on her workissued laptop. 310 After Stengart filed her complaint, her employer took a
picture of her work-issued computer's hard drive (that is, a "forensic
image of the hard drive"), which allowed the employer to review the
employee's Internet browsing history and read the communications that
she wrote to her lawyer.31 On appeal, the court held that the employee
had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy regarding pre-suit
emails exchanged between her and her lawyers.3 12 Moreover, the
attorney-client privilege protected these emails.3 13
305. Id. at 1278.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 973 A.2d 390, 401 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2009), aff'das modified, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
308. 973 A.2d 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), aff'd as modified, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J.
2010).
309. Id. at 393.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at402.
313. Id.; see also Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03-CV-6327, 2006 WL 1318387,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006). On the other hand, another court found that an employee waived
the attorney-client privilege by communicating with her attorney over her work email system where
the company policy clearly notified all employees that emails were "subject to monitoring, search or
interception at any time." Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236, 2006 WL 1307882, at
*4 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006); see also Alamar Ranch, LLC v. Cnty. of Boise, No. CV-09-004-S-BLW,
2009 WL 3669741 (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2009). In Alamar Ranch, Jeri Kirkpatrick, an employee of the
Idaho Housing and Finance Association ("IHFA"), "did not attempt to protect the confidentiality of
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The employer had a policy (in the company handbook) stating that
the company reserves and will exercise "the right to review, audit,
intercept, access, and disclose all matters on the company's media
systems and services at any time, with or without notice. 314 This
policy added that emails and voicemail "are not to be considered
private or personal to any individual employee., 315 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that, notwithstanding the company policy, the attorneyclient privilege protects the former employee's personal emails to
her lawyer.3 16
The court broadly rejected the employer's argument that, by buying
its employee's talents throughout the workday and by owning its own
servers, it necessarily caused anything done by those employees during
work hours to become company property.317 The employer has no more
right to examine the employee's personal documents stored on a
computer than to rifle through a folder in an office file cabinet
containing an employee's private papers, or to examine the contents of
an employee's pockets.3 18 The court concluded that the employer's
lawyer had violated New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
("NJRPC") Rule 4.4. 3 19 The opposing lawyer read emails that: (1) the
employee did not voluntarily turn over; and (2) the attorney-client
privilege protected.32 °
The employee could reasonably expect that email communications
with her lawyer through her personal account would remain private, and
that sending and receiving them via a company laptop did not eliminate

the messages by using a web-based password-protected e-mail account. She simply used her work
e-mail." Alamar Ranch, LLC, 2009 WL 3669741, at *4. The court found a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege for some emails but not for others, as "Kirkpatrick waived the privilege for those
messages she sent from her work computer." Id. In contrast, the privilege was not waived as to
emails upon which the employee was "merely copied" at her work email address, and which were
retrieved by the employer:
There is no evidence that the [clients] were aware--or should have been aware-that by
copying Kirkpatrick on their e-mails to [their attomey] they were exposing their e-mails
to IHFA scrutiny. As far as the [clients] were concerned, they were having a confidential
discussion with their attorney. The Court refuses to extend the constructive knowledge
that [the attorney] had about the monitoring of work-based e-mails to the [clients]laypersons are simply not on 'high-alert' for such things as attorneys must be.
Id. at *5.
314. Stengart, 973 A.2d at 394 & n.2. The authors of the company handbook may have meant
"server" instead of "services." Id.
315. Id. at 394.
316. Id. at402.
317. Id. at401.
318. Id. at399.
319. Id. at 403 (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009)).
320. Id.
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the attorney-client privilege that protected them. 32 1 By reading
emails that were at least arguably privileged, and failing to notify the
employee promptly about them, Loving Care's counsel breached
NJRPC Rule 4.4(b).322
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that
employer's counsel acted unethically by failing to stop reading email
messages.3 23 The law firm hired a computer forensic expert who
retrieved emails that her company-issued laptop had automatically saved
on its hard drive in a "cache" folder of temporary Internet files.324
Stengart did not know that her browser software made copies of each
webpage she viewed.325 Therefore, when she accessed her personal,
password protected email account on Yahoo's website, the laptop kept a
record even though she never saved her Yahoo identification or
password on the company laptop.326 She used that Yahoo account to
communicate with her lawyer about her problems at work.327
The court held that the employer's law firm acted unethically: the
law firm's "review of privileged e-mails between Stengart and her
lawyer, and use of the contents of at least one e-mail in responding to
interrogatories" violated NJRPC Rule 4.4(b).32 8 The employer's law firm
did not act in bad faith: in fact, the court agreed that the law firm did not
hack into plaintiffs personal account, nor did it "maliciously seek out
attomey-client documents in a clandestine way., 329 The employer
"legitimately attempted to preserve evidence to defend a civil
lawsuit.,

330

Nevertheless, the court noted, "the Firm should have

promptly notified opposing counsel when it discovered the nature of the

321. Id.at40l.
322. Id.; see Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) (holding that there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages stored by a service provider), cert. granted sub

nom., City of Ontario v. Quon, 558 U.S. 1090 (2009). The case was finally decided on the merits in
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). The Supreme Court held that a city's review of a

police officer's text messages was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Id.at 2628. The Court specifically noted that people do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer;
however, special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, "make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable for government employers." Id.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 666 (N.J. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.at 665.
Id.at 656.

328.

Id.at 666 (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2009)).

329.
330.

Id.
Id.
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e-mails.,, 331 The law firm's "error was in not setting aside the arguably
privileged messages once it realized they were attomey-client
to notify its adversary or seek court
communications, and failing either3 32
permission before reading further.
The court then remanded so that the trial court could determine the
appropriate sanction, such as "disqualification of the Firm, screening of
attorneys, the imposition of costs, or some other remedy. 333 The court
explained that, "[i]n deciding what sanctions to impose, the trial court
should evaluate the seriousness of the breach in light of the specific
nature of the e-mails, the manner in which they were identified,
and used, and other considerations noted by the
reviewed, disseminated,
3 34
Appellate Division.
Now, compare that result to ABA Formal Opinion 11-460, on the
"Duty when Lawyer Receives Copies of a Third Party's E-mail
Communications with Counsel. 3 35 This Opinion is the companion to
Formal Opinion 11-459, both released the same day.336 Formal
Opinion 11-460 covers the comparable ethical duties of the employer's
lawyer when he has access to the employee's emails because the
employer, using computer skills, accesses those emails.3 37 The lawyer
knows that these emails are the employee's private, privileged
communications with her lawyer.338
ABA Formal Opinion 11-460 assumes that the employer uncovered
these privileged emails located in the employee's business email file or
on the employee's workplace computer or other device. 339 The ABA
advises, "neither Rule 4.4(b) nor any other Rule requires the employer's
lawyer to notify opposing counsel of the receipt of the
communications., 340 The Opinion acknowledges that other law might
prohibit the lawyer from reading these attorney-client privileged
documents of the employee that the employer was able to uncover from
34 1
the employer's computer system, but no ABA Rule limits the lawyer.
These computer documents, like the emails between the employee and
her lawyer, are "not 'inadvertently sent' when they are retrieved by a

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
Id.; see ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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third person
from a public or private place where they are stored
34 2
or left.

Commission 20/20's Report to the ABA makes no mention of ABA
Formal Opinion 11-460. 4 Similarly, it makes no mention of ABA
Formal Opinion 11-459.344 Yet, one would think they are both
relevant. Both deal with computer-generated documents. 345 Formal
Opinion 11-460 is particularly material because it offers a very different
definition of "inadvertently sent., 346 Commission 20/20 does not say
whether it is rejecting that definition.347 Nor does it explain if its
revisions are overruling Formal Opinion 11 -460.348
Moreover, Formal Opinion 11-460 goes on to say that, if other law
(such as the law of civil procedure) requires the employer's lawyer to
notify the employee's lawyer that the employer has retrieved the
employee's attorney-client email communications, then the lawyer, of
course, must obey that other law. 3 49 However, if other law does not
impose this notification (the employee may be in pre-litigation with the
employer, so discovery rules do not yet apply), then the ABA position is
that it is ethically permissible for the employer's lawyer not to inform
the opposing lawyer that the employer's lawyer is reading privileged
emails that the employer could never subpoena, but that the employer
could obtain using its computer experts. 5 0
These ABA Opinions offer an interesting contrast with the new
Comments to Rule 4.4. For example, the employer can search an
employee's hard drive using complicated computer technology to break
any passwords and read the employee's privileged communications with

342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. See COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-6.
344. See id.
345. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
346. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
347. See COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
348. See id.(discussing the ambiguity surrounding the phrase "inadvertently sent" and
proposing a clear definition, but not mentioning any prior definition presented in Formal
Op. 06-440). Formal Op. 06-440 advised that Rule 4.4(b) does not obligate a lawyer to notify her
opposing counsel that the lawyer has received privileged or otherwise confidential materials of the
adverse party from someone who was not authorized to provide the materials, as long as the lawyer
did not receive the materials because of the sender's inadvertence. See ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006) ("Unsolicited Receipt of Privileged or Confidential
Materials."). Commission 20/20 also does not discuss or even cite this Opinion. See COMMISSION
20/20 REPORT, supranote 13, at 5-6.
349. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
350. See id.
(stating that it is up to the employer-client to determine whether to report if no law
establishes a reporting obligation).
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her lawyer.351 However, if the employer intentionally turns over an
electronic document to the employee's lawyer and that lawyer discovers
metadata on it that the employee's lawyer "reasonably should know"
was inadvertently sent, the employee's lawyer must promptly tell the
employer's lawyer.352 If the sending lawyer does not want to send
metadata, it is his obligation not to send it, according to the ABA
Opinion, but if he does send it, the new ABA Comments say that the
receiving lawyer should "promptly notify the sender," and has the
professional right to delete it unread.353 Meanwhile, another part of the
ABA is publishing material to lawyers advising them how and why they
should use computer experts to uncover metadata.354
We are left with a set of rules that are, frankly, hard to rationalize,
unless one is a legal realist and assumes that the establishment
members of the Bar are the ones developing the ethics rules in these
situations. If we become cynical legal realists, we can find a rationale.
Let me elaborate.
As litigation has become more complex (with class action lawsuits,
particularly in the areas of product liability, employment discrimination,
355
and securities fraud), so also has discovery become more complex.
Nowadays, thousands and thousands of documents are in electronic
form. Sometimes, computer programs, rather than individual lawyers,
are the entities that make the decision to turn over these documents.
Other computer programs search for keywords because no one lawyer
could read and evaluate all of these electronic documents.3 56

351.

Seeid.

352.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2013).

353. See id. R. 4.4(b) cmts. 2-3.
354. Joan E. Feldman, Top Ten Things to Do when Collecting Electronic Evidence, FAM.
ADVOCATE, Winter 2007, at 9, 9-12. The article states that:
With the pervasive use of computers as business and communication tools, data
generated and stored electronically has become the de facto target for discovery. Your
goal is to find useful information and collect it in a manner that assures it can be
admitted into evidence.
Id. at 12.
355. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). The Opinion
states that "the availability of xerography, and the proliferation of facsimile machines and electronic
mail make it technologically ever more likely that through inadvertence, privileged or confidential
materials will be produced to opposing counsel." Id. This is the Opinion that also embraced the
position that the receiving lawyer "should abide by sending lawyer's instructions." Id. Rule 4.4 now
rejects that position and the ABA has withdrawn Formal Opinion 92-368 in Formal Opinion 05-437.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
356. How Is PredictiveCoding Revolutionizing the Economics of eDiscovery?, A.B.A. J. (Jan.
22, 2013, 9:49 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/advertising/article/how-ispredictive-coding_
revolutionizingthe economics of ediscovery.
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In the nature of things, often it is the plaintiffs lawyers who
discover a lot more material than defense lawyers would discover. There
is only so much information that a disgruntled employee, or stock
purchaser, or tort victim of a product would have. In contrast,
defendants have a great deal of reasonably relevant information, much in
electronic form.
Defendants, thus, are more likely to make a mistake in turning over
information. The ABA's Commission 20/20 responded by proposing a
new Rule-with the crucial language buried in a Comment-that
prevents the opposing party (the plaintiffs lawyer) from examining the
documents or metadata without first "promptly notifying" the defense
counsel.357 However, there is no comparable Rule regarding information
embedded in non-computer-generated documents, for example, a hard
copy, and therefore
Commission 20/20's regulation does not extend to
358
hard copies.
Commission 20/20 told the ABA House of Delegates that it
designed its changes to treat hard copy and electronic documents the
same. 359 However, Commission 20/20 ends up treating electronic
documents quite differently. Lawyers can examine information
embedded in analogue documents, but lawyers cannot examine
information embedded in digital documents (metadata) without first
going through the notice requirement of Rule 4.4(b).3 6 ° In both cases, the
lawyers secure the documents by subpoena, and, in both cases, the other
side has voluntarily turned them over. 36 1 However, in the case of digital
documents, Commission 20/20 tells us that the voluntary turnover is not
really voluntary because the lawyer may not have understood that he
was turning over the metadata.3 62

357.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2013).

358. See id.; Carolyn Fairless, Ethics: Attorney's Duty of Competence with Technology,
http://www.trial.com/cle/materials/2013-ny/fairless.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (hinting that
lawyers can avoid sending metadata and being subject to Rule 4.4 by sending hard copies).
359. COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. Commission 20/20 stated:
[T]he Commission is proposing to amend Rule 4.4(b) to make clear that the Rule
governs both paper documents as well as electronically stored information ... [and] to
define the phrase 'inadvertently sent' in Comment [2] to give lawyers more guidance as
to when notification requirement of Model Rule 4.4(b) is triggered.
Id. (emphasis added).
360. Id. at 6; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2013).
361.

See DOUGLAS R. YOUNG, ADVISING THE CORPORATE CLIENT ON THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 8 (2001), available at http://www.fbm.com/files/Publication/523409e008a9-4ca6-8699-7ac3fa6b9e29/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/64095eae-b207-4ace-963c7adb
25385948/E4C58E30-9D 15-4950-9AC8-30CCB4BE9A72_document.pdf.
362. See COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
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What of ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 advising lawyers who do not
want to turn over digital data to scrub the document, assuming that doing
so would not obstruct evidence? 363 That Opinion puts the ethical
obligation on the sending lawyer, not the receiving lawyer.36
Commission 20/20 offers no explanation why it is rejecting the ABA's
formal interpretation of its Rules. Instead, Commission 20/20 creates an
obligation to protect lawyers who make mistakes.
The net result is that some lawyers who make mistakes have an
ethical argument that their adversary lawyer should have warned
them rather than take advantage of their mistake. However, this
result only applies to digital documents, so defense lawyers are more
likely to benefit.
V.

CONCLUSION

When lawyers receive a document-whether a hard copy or an
electronic document-that they know the adversary sent them
inadvertently (for example, a fax or email mistakenly sent to an
adversary lawyer instead of to co-counsel), the black letter rule in
Rule 4.4 requires the lawyer to notify the other side but does not require
the receiving lawyer to return the document unread. Whether the
receiving lawyer can use that document depends, in essence, on the law
of evidence. If the court decides that the document lost its privileged
status (perhaps because the sending lawyer acted unreasonably), the
receiving lawyer can use the document.
In some cases, the sending lawyer sends a document advertently
(for example, in response to a discovery request). In that situation as
well, the lawyer should be able to use the document, unless some other
law, such as the law of evidence, says otherwise. For example, the
sending lawyer advertently sent over a large group of documents, one of
which is a privileged document that the sending lawyer did not intend to
disclose. In many cases, courts will hold that the document in question
remains privileged ifthe sending lawyer acted reasonably. Hence, the
receiving lawyer should not use that document in that particular
circumstance. As stated in Formal Opinion 05-437, "Rule 4.4(b) thus
only obligates the receiving lawyer to notify the sender of the
inadvertent transmission promptly. The rule does not require the
receiving lawyer either to refrain from examining
the materials or to
365
lawyer.
sending
the
of
instructions
the
by
abide
363. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
364. See id.
365. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005).
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As the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers has
advised, it "is not a violation [of legal ethics] to accept the advantage of
inadvertent, and even negligent, disclosure of confidential information
by the other lawyer, if the effect of the other lawyer's action is to waive
the right of that lawyer's client to assert confidentiality. 3 66 Moreover, if
the receiving lawyer may use the document, the receiving lawyer should
be able to examine and use all of the information within the document,
including information embedded within the document. That information
may be embedded in a hard copy document (such as fingerprints, the age
or type of the paper), or it may be embedded in a digital document
(metadata). 6 7 If the sending lawyer does not want the receiving lawyer
to look at metadata, he or she should not send it. As ABA Formal
Opinion 06-442 advised, the Model Rules do not prohibit lawyers from
discovering and using metadata found in documents that other lawyers
transmit to them, even though the other lawyer may 368
not know that the
electronic version of the document contains metadata.
In 2012, the ABA added a new Comment to Rule 4.4, which
provides that Rule 4.4 creates an obligation on the receiving lawyer "to
promptly notify the sender" only when "the receiving lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the
receiving lawyer., 369 The concept of sending metadata inadvertently is
peculiar when applied to a lawyer who advertently intends to turn over
the particular document that contains the metadata. One wonders how
the receiving lawyer should know that the sending lawyer sent the
document advertently but sent the metadata "inadvertently," when the
sending lawyer voluntarily turns over the digital document pursuant to
discovery and does not claim that the document itself (as opposed to the
metadata within it) was sent by accident. After all, no ethics Rule
requires the receiving lawyer "to promptly notify" the sending lawyer
that an analogue document has other data embedded within it-such as
fingerprints, the age of the paper, and the age of the ink on the paper.370
In the midst of these Opinions, language in the Comments to ABA
Model Rule 4.4, which the ABA House of Delegates added in 2012,
confuses the matter. The Comments suggest that metadata in a digital
document has an exalted position, in contrast to analogue data in a hard
copy. 371 The Report to the ABA House of Delegates did not make clear
366.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. e (2000).

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supraPart V.C.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) cmt. 2 (2013) (emphasis added).
Yet, Rule 4.4, Comment 2 does require prompt notification regarding metadata. See id.
See id.
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that it is exalting metadata or intending to overrule any ABA
Formal Opinion. Yet, the changes in the Comments to Rule 4.4 treat
metadata differently.37 2
Courts in the several states may amend their rules in order to
conform to the ABA Model Rules, and they may even give metadata an
exalted position. However, given past history, many courts may simply
refuse to follow the ABA's lead on this issue, 373 just as they refused to
follow the ABA's efforts to ban non-misleading lawyer participation in
Internet chat rooms. Other courts may adopt these Comments, but may
interpret them to mean very little by always concluding that the sending
lawyers meant to include the metadata in electronic documents that they
voluntarily turned over to the other side.

372. If the lawyer sent the document advertently, it is hard to understand how the lawyer sent
over the metadata "inadvertently." Yet, the intent of Commission 20/20 appears to be to ban mining
metadata if the sending lawyer did not know that the metadata existed. COMMISSION 20/20 REPORT,
supra note 13, at 6.

373. See Jones, supra note 171, at 1270 n.47 (collecting ethics opinions of numerous states that
have rejected the ABA's lead and do not require the receiving lawyer to notify the sending lawyer).
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